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ABSTRACT 
EVALUATION OF MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT PLAN OF A 
TURKISH ARMORED 
BATTALION VIA SIMULATION 
 
 
 
Selim Müslüm 
M.S. in Industrial Engineering 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. İhsan Sabuncuoğlu 
July, 2001 
 
 
 
As being ready for war as soon as possible and with minimum casualties during the 
crises is the first mission for the troops, the Mobilization and Deployment Plan arises as one 
of the most important topic for Army. Because this plan includes all the activities that troops 
have to execute for responding against enemy immediately. In this study, the performance of 
existing Mobilization and Deployment Plan of a Turkish Armored Battalion is evaulated via 
simulation. The Mobilization and Deployment simulation model allows military operation 
planners to build models of Mobilization and Deployment operation of troops early in 
decision process; perform bottleneck analysis and take necessary measures against the 
problem areas; and perform risk management of the operations before conducting the real 
ones.   
In this thesis, our objectives are to evaulate the Mobilization and Deployment system 
of an Armored Battalion, find out the significant factors of enemy threat on the existing 
system, detect the most hazardous border and the most hazardous factor for each border, and 
discover the system limits. The output of the model is analysed by experimental design, and 
ranking and selection procedures. The code of simulation model is written in ARENA 
simulation program.  
 
 
 
 
 
Key Words: Military Simulation, War Gaming, Combat Simulation, Force Projection 
 
 
 
 III   
 
ÖZET 
 
SİMULASYONLA BİR TÜRK TANK TABURUNUN ALARM 
PLANININ ANALİZİNİN YAPILMASI  
 
 
 Selim Müslüm 
Endüstri Mühendisliği Bölümü Yüksek Lisans 
Danışman: Doç. İhsan SABUNCUOĞLU 
July, 2001 
 
 
 
 Kriz anında savaşa en kısa zamanda ve en az hasar ile hazır olmak askeri birliklerin 
en önemli görevi olduğundan, Alarm Planı Türk Ordusu için en önemli konulardan birisidir. 
Çünkü bu Alarm Planı askeri birliklerin savaş öncesi yapması gereken bütün faaliyatleri 
kapsamaktadır. Bu çalışmada, bir tank taburunun alarm planı analiz edilmektedir. Alarm 
simülasyon modeli, askeri operasyon planlayıcılarına, karar aşamasından önce alarm 
operasyonun modelini kurma; plandaki problemlerin tesbit edip bunlara karşı tedbir alma, ve 
gerçek operasyondan önce risk analizi yapma imkanı sağlar. 
 Bu tez çalışmasında, Alarm Planının analiz edilmesi, şu an kullanılan sisteme etki 
eden faktörlerin ve etkilerinin tesbit edilmesi, ve sistem limitlerinin tesbit edilmesi ana 
amaçlarımızdır.Alarm modelinin sonuçları, deneysel dizayn ve sıralama ve seçme 
prosedürleri kullanılarak analiz edilmiştir. Modelin kodu ARENA simülasyon programıyla 
yazılmıştır. 
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Askeri Simülasyon, Harp Oyunu, Savaş Simülasyonu, Birlik Kaydırma 
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GLOSSARY 
 
AIR ATTACK: Assault with air combat vehicles (warplane, helicopter). 
ALERT DISPERSION AREA: Area where the troops spread for minimizing the  
casualties during an enemy attack. 
ALERT AND MOBILIZATION PLAN: The plan that troops execute for 
being ready for combat as soon as possible. 
AMBUSH: An unexpected, trap-type military operation. 
ARTILLERY ATTACK: Assault with the artillery guns (cannons). 
ASSEMBLY AREA: The area where troops make last preparations for further military 
operations. 
BREAKDOWN: Malfunctioning of the vehicles. 
DEPLOYMENT: The strategic relocation and concentration of forces and their 
support base (manpower and logistics) from barrack into a theater. 
MARCH: Travelling of troops under the threat of enemy. 
MINEFIELD: An area where the ground mines are positioned. 
MOBILIZATION: A process by which the armed forces reach a state of enhanced 
readiness in preparation for war or other national emergencies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT PLAN OF AN ARMORED 
       BATTALION  
Mobilization describes a process by which the armed forces reach a state of 
enhanced readiness in preparation for war or other national emergencies. It includes 
activating all or part of the reserve component as well as assembling and organizing 
personnel, supplies, and material prior to deployment. Strategic deployment is the 
strategic relocation and concentration of forces and their support base (manpower and 
logistics) from barrack into a theater. Deployments may take the form of a forcible entry 
for crisis response or unopposed entry for natural disasters or humanitarian (Department 
of Army, 1996). We do not handle the activities of the reserve components; we deal with 
the activities of active components of an Armored Battalion.  
We model the mobilization and deployment of an Armor Battalion to Assembly 
Area via simulation. The aim of mobilization and deployment is to be ready for combat 
with minimum casualties and equipment loss. This activity has to be made as soon as 
possible, because it occurs under the disturbance of enemy, any lateness can cause many 
human casualties. Because of that reason evaluation of mobilization and deployment 
plan has great importance in military. 
An armored battalion is formed from four companies. First three companies are 
identical armored (tank) companies; the other one is Headquarters and Headquarters 
Company. In our simulation model an Armored Company has nine wheeled trucks, 
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fourteen armored vehicles (13 tanks and 1 APC). The Headquarters and Headquarters 
Company has twenty-three armored vehicles, seventy-five, wheeled trucks. In total 
Armored Battalion have 65 armored vehicles and 102-wheeled trucks.  
As a strategy when there is a sense of danger or threat, Turkish Army starts to 
load ammunition, gas and equipment to the vehicles for being totally ready for future 
operations. So when the alert order is announced, most of equipment and ammunition 
has already been loaded. Troops only make partial loading after alert order. 
Mobilization starts with the alert order, immediately soldiers start to make partial 
loading of equipment and guns quickly. Without waiting others, each vehicle starts to 
travel from garages to Alert Dispersion Area individually to minimize the casualties and 
vehicle losses caused by enemy attacks. The breakdown of vehicles may occur in garage 
after alert order, the other vehicles pull off the broken vehicles to the Alert Dispersion 
Area.  In daytime at most in half an hour, at night in 45 minutes from the alert order, 
Armored battalion has to complete its deployment to Alert Spread Area. After an hour 
from the alert order, reconnaissance group starts to travel Assembly Area to secure the 
roads and Assembly Area from enemy. Approximately after two hours from the alert 
order, main troops have to be ready for travelling to Assembly Area.  
In Alert Dispersion Area, Armored Battalion members make preparations for 
travelling to Assembly Area that is the last place to complete the preparations for 
combat. During travel, vehicle breakdowns can occur, enemy can make air and artillery 
assaults, lay ambush and use ground mines to destruct vehicles and kill soldiers. These 
assaults of enemy cause vehicle destruction and delay that will affect the success of 
further operations. When a vehicle is shot, its crew moves off the vehicle out of road not 
to prevent traffic and tries to repair. If the damage is not repairable for the crew, they 
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wait for the maintenance team. Maintenance team arriving shot area immediately begins 
to repair the vehicle. If vehicle is destructed completely, it is left in a safe region with its 
crew, and maintenance team continues travelling. In our study, activity ends when the 
troops reach Assembly Area. We do not deal with the activities in Assembly Area. The 
figure 1.2.1. shows the travel plan of Armored Battalion. 
We study on the system that starts with the alert order, and ends with the arriving 
of all vehicles to Assembly Area. We do not cope with the activities before the alert 
order, and we assume that before the alert order, ammunition and fuel oil loadings are 
completed, and most of the equipment is loaded to wheeled-trucks. We analyze the 
system in the name of vehicles; we do not deal with the soldiers individually.  
In this study, we evaluate the performance of existing Mobilization and 
Deployment Plan of a Turkish Armored Battalion. The objectives of this study are to 
examine the behavior of existing Mobilization and Deployment Plan of an Armored 
Battalion in Turkish Army, establish the nature of relationship among one or more 
significant factor and the system performance, analyze the efficiency of this plan, 
compare different scenarios and improve system performance. We also try to detect the 
most hazardous border of Turkey and the most hazardous factor for each border, and 
discover the system limits. We focus on five factors that are breakdowns of vehicles, air 
attack, artillery attack, mine fields and ambushes of enemy in our study.  
We give a brief summary of usages below. In the situation of the system does not 
work properly, we try to detect the major problem areas (bottlenecks) of the system by 
sensitivity analysis, then propose the modifications to make the system work properly. 
Determining the significant effects of five factors that we state above can be useful 
information for development of the national defense plans. 
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Figure 1.2.1. The march plan of Armored Battalion for wheeled trucks and armored  
                      vehicles 
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The defense arrangements may focus on the most significant factors. The most critique 
border information may also be used for improvement of the national defense plans. 
Selection of the most hazardous factor and rankings of five factors according to the 
threat for each border of Turkey may guide the commanders of these armored battalions 
for deciding which factors they should emphasize on during the planning of the field 
exercises. Being aware of his Armored Battalion’s limits, commanders can make more 
healthy decisions that may have chanced the faith of the war.  
Chapter organization is as follows. Chapter 2 presents the related literature with 
the simulation software and methods; the requirements of military simulation modeling; 
combat modeling and simulation applications that provide useful information for 
modeling combat activities. Chapter 3 interprets the implementation of simulation model 
of Mobilization and Deployment Plan of a Turkish Armored Battalion. Chapter 4 
presents experimental design of five factors that breakdown of vehicles, air attack, 
artillery attack, minefields and ambushes of enemy. We implement the ANOVA 
procedure to find out the significant factors for three different performance measures in 
this chapter. Chapter 5 includes the ranking and selection of the most critique region of 
 6
Turkey out of ten for three different performance measures and we also apply analytic 
hierarchy process to identify a mutual most critique region for all of three performance 
measures. Chapter 6 interprets the ranking and selection of the most critique factor out of 
five factors for each of ten regions in Turkey. Chapter 7 presents the limits of an 
Armored Battalion executing the Mobilization and Deployment Plan. In Chapter 8, we 
give the conclusions of the research. As a final step, ideas and suggestions for future 
researches are listed. In Appendices, outputs and some figures of armored battalion are 
given.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 During the literature review, we have not come across any study that is directly 
related with our topic. We meet some of abstracts of military researches conducted in 
U.S. but because of privacy of topic, they are not open to publication. So we cannot get 
detailed information about these military researches. Instead, we present the references in 
three groups that are the simulation software and methodology, military simulation, and 
combat simulation (war gaming). As a final step, we give the summary table of related 
literature in Table 2.1.  
 
2.1. SIMULATION SOFTWARE AND METHODOLOGY 
We construct the frame of our simulation model, verify and validate it under the 
light of some of techniques and ideas presented in the papers in this part of literature 
review.  
Throughout our study we use the basic principles, which stated in Banks (1998). 
In this study, the author explains the fundamentals of the modeling methodologies, gives 
brief information about the use of simulation and then recommends a stepwise logic for 
all phases of simulation. In our thesis, we use ARENA software for coding system 
because it is a powerful tool that meets all of our requirements. Takus and Profozich 
(1997) explain the software and its capabilities in their tutorial. 
     Sergeant (1998) discusses approaches to verification and validation of simulation 
models and how model verification and validation relate to the model development 
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process. After defining various validation techniques he describes conceptual model 
validity, model verification, operational validity, and data validity and recommends a 
procedure. 
     Kleijnen (1999) explains which statistical techniques can be used to validate 
simulation models depending on which real-life data are available. He categorizes the 
situations as the cases of having no data, only output data, both input and output data. To 
explain these three cases he provides some case study summary.  
     Alexopoulos and Seila (1998), Kelton (1997), Centeno and Reyes (1998), and 
Sanchez (1998) all study on the procedures, techniques about the simulation output 
analysis. We use the techniques determined for the terminating systems.  
 
2.2. MILITARY SIMULATION 
The papers in that section discuss the general military issues and necessary 
techniques for military modeling and simulation. By the help of this literature, we 
understand the military aspect of simulation and recognize the differences of military 
simulation.  We take the guidance of these papers for overcoming of the problems that 
we encounter during the model development (lacking of real data, etc.). We also 
implement techniques for verification, validation and accreditation of military models 
mentioned in some of these papers. 
Page and Smith (1998) give the overview of military training simulation in the 
form of an introductory tutorial. They provide basic terminology, and current trends and 
research focus in the military simulation domain. Also they explain verification, 
validation and accreditation of military models. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) is currently embracing object-oriented 
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programming as a possible solution to problems that beset current simulation tools in the 
paper of Painter (1995). He mentions about the benefits that are object reuse (sharing 
objects between simulations), data hiding (encapsulation), and code reuse and extension 
(polymorphism) and also the associated cost as a paradigm. Finally he states that the 
immediate need facing the military simulation is to agree on and build a framework for 
object-oriented simulations. 
Smith (1998) identifies and explains essential techniques necessary for modern 
military training simulations. He provides a brief historical introduction; discussion of 
system architecture; multiple interactive training simulations; event and time 
management; distributed simulation; and verification, validation, and accreditation. After 
all, he discusses the fundamental principles in modeling and specific military modeling 
domains. While discussing the fundamental principles of modeling, he stresses on the 
importance of modeling the right problem, complete and accurate understanding, 
credibility and construction of the model subject to some constraints. Under the heading 
of physical modeling, he focuses on the importance and usage of physical objects, which 
include vehicles, people, and machinery involved in the activities of moving, perceiving 
other objects, and interacting with them in the military simulations. Behavioral, 
environmental and multi-resolution modelings are the other discussed subjects in his 
study.   
Kang and Roland (1998) discuss the military simulation within the subjects of 
organizations that deal with and their areas of study, classification of military simulation, 
simulation as a training tool, and applications. They stress on the subjects of advanced 
distributed simulation, distributed interactive simulation, and high-level architecture. 
Roland (1998) gives an overview of the panel “The future of military simulation” 
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in which military simulation is categorized as including engineering models, analyses 
models and training models. The members answer the questions about their background; 
goals and objectives of their involvement in modeling and simulation; HLA studies; 
major problems in the current state of modeling and simulation development and use; 
today’s major modeling and simulation opportunities and challenges. 
Sisti (1996) studies on the topics of interest to researchers in the simulation 
community and present some of selected Air Force programs. He deals with the wide 
variety of research issues in simulation science being presented by government, 
academia and industry, and their application to the military domain.  
Hatley (1997) discusses the difficulties, ways and cost of the military simulation 
model validation and verification. He compares the other simulation models with the 
military ones in terms of validation, verification and accreditation. 
Kathman (1995) summarizes the data collection process in field combat 
simulation of U.S. Army. He describes four basic types of instrumentation that have been 
developed to assist data collection in field combat simulation and gives explanations of 
these four basic types. 
           
2.3. COMBAT MODELING AND SIMULATION (WAR-GAMING) 
 Our simulation model is an example of combat simulation because it includes the 
combat activities (air attack, artillery assault, mine fields and ambushes of enemy). We 
give the some of the applications of war-gaming in that section. To reach detailed 
information about war-gaming applications is nearly impossible because they are kept as 
secret projects. Under the light of limited information, we implement some of war-
gaming modeling techniques used in these combat simulation applications for some parts 
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of our model during the model development. 
Caldwell, Wood and Pate (1995) summarize a two-year project, called JLINK, 
which enables the JANUS, Army constructive interactive simulation to be connected to 
manned land and air combat vehicle simulators, using Distributed Interactive Simulation 
(DIS) Protocol Data Units (PDU). The JLINK project was one of the firsts to 
demonstrate that a constructive simulation can be connected to and realistically interact 
with DIS compliant virtual combat vehicle and aircraft simulators. They discuss how this 
was accomplished, highlight the major considerations involved, and describe the 
interface model that was developed to connect JANUS to the DIS world. 
Parker (1995) explains a unique approach developed for analyzing force 
structures of the armed forces of U.S. With this approach, new ways of measuring 
combat readiness are available to ensure that the armed forces remain ready to fight 
during the defense draw down of the 1990s. He explains a network representative 
language Dynamic Simulation that combines the continuous variable features of system 
dynamics and the discrete event features of conventional simulation techniques. 
Mostaglio, Johnson and Peterson (1993) give an overview of a Distributed 
Interactive Simulations (DIS) training system used by Army, which is called The Close 
Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT). They discuss how it will use the DIS standard 
protocols and semi-automated forces within its architecture, the program’s development 
methodology, and its role in future Army training. 
Childs and Lubaczewski (1987) propose a simulation model used for training 
Brigade and Battalion commanders and their staffs to exercise procedures and decision-
making skills. They briefly address the background of command and control training and 
provide an in-depth discussion of the COMBAT-SIM model.  
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Parker (1991) gives an overview of combat vehicle reliability assessment 
simulation model, which portrays the disposition, or status of vehicles over time. He also 
suggests using this information to initialize the other combat models in which reliability 
may not previously have been a consideration. 
Allen and Wilson (1988) describe a methodology for developing combat 
simulations that may be readily tailored to specific study issues, and structured so as to 
threat both qualitative and quantitative variables using the natural language of military 
planners. This methodology was developed for the RAND Strategy Assessment System 
(RSAS) and exploits a new programming language called RAND-ABEL. They also 
explain in what areas RAND-ABEL language is used. 
Blais (1994) gives the description of a computer assisted, two-sided warfare 
gaming system designed to support training of U.S. Marine Corps commanders and their 
staffs. He explains development phases and usage areas of this simulation system, which 
is called The Marine Air Ground Task Force Tactical Warfare Simulation.  
Henry (1994) describes The Corps Battle Simulation as a standard tool for 
training commanders and their staffs in U.S. Army. This simulation model is written in C 
programming language, and combat is modeled mathematically using Lanchester-type 
equations as described by Taylor (1981). He also stated the hardware and evolution of 
The Corps Battle Simulation. 
Youngren, Parry, Gaver and Jacobs (1994) give description of a research 
conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School into new methodologies for joint theater-
level combat simulation modeling, emphasizing C31, operational intelligence, decision 
making under certainty, and aggregated stochastic process modeling. Research outcomes 
to date as well as a prototype software tool are described in their paper. 
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Russell and McQuay (1993) give an overview of a system called The Joint 
Modeling and Simulation System (J-MASS) whose development standards and software 
tools support a disciplined approach to the development, configuration, operation, and 
analysis of digital models and simulations. They explain that J-MASS provides a 
common modeling architecture with a library of verified and validated software 
components and models of weapon systems developed by different military communities 
for Department of Defense. Oswalt (1995) presents the technologies critical to military 
simulation, summarizes their status, proposes a concept of what technologies are likely 
to be applied in the future military simulations, and concludes with a review of two 
current simulation architectures-SIMOBJECT and J-MASS. 
Garrambone (1992) gives an overview of one of the most difficult topics of 
Operations Research- combat modeling and simulation. He describes a team leader 
standpoint, the requirements, which drive the modeling process used to support DoD 
studies. He discusses models, (sources and construction notes), scenarios, data, computer 
concepts, team composition, and many other important considerations needed to 
accomplish the analytical study tasks. The reader, novice or seasoned, will find that this 
approach to the subject contains insights rarely found in manuals, covering topics from 
defining the study environment, to the techniques for presenting study results. 
Garrabrants (1998) proposes “an expansion of simulation systems’ role to support 
all levels of command and control functioning, especially staff planning after receipt of 
orders and mission rehearsal” in this study. He explains how Marine Tactical Warfare 
Simulation (MTWS), an advanced simulation system, is used to model all aspects of 
combat (air, land, sea, and amphibious ship-to-shore activities) and gives detailed 
information about its usage.  We give summary of related literature in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1. Summary table of related literature  
 
Simulation 
Software and 
Methodology 
Takush and Profozich (1997) 
Sargent(1998) 
 
Sanchez (1998) 
Kleijnen (1999) 
 
Alexopoulos & Seila (1998) 
 
Centeno & Reyes (1998) 
Kelton (1997) 
ARENA software tutorial 
Verification and validation of 
simulation models 
ABC’ s of output analysis 
Statistical techniques and data 
availability 
Advanced methods for simulation 
output analysis 
Simulation output analysis 
Statistical analysis of simulation output 
  
Military 
Simulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page & Smith (1998) 
 
Painter (1995) 
 
Smith (1998) 
 
Kang & Roland (1998) 
Roland (1998) 
Sisti (1996) 
 
 
Hatley (1997) 
Introduction to military training 
simulation 
Object oriented military simulation 
development and application 
Essential techniques for military 
modeling and simulation 
Military simulation 
The future of military simulation 
Modeling and simulation technologies 
for military applications 
Verification and validation in military 
simulation 
 
 
Combat 
Modeling 
and 
Simulation 
 
Caldwell & Wood & Pate (1995) 
Parker (1995) 
 
 
Mostaglio, et al. (1993) 
 
Childs & Lubaczewski (1987) 
 
Parker (1991) 
 
Allen & Wilson (1988) 
 
 
Blais (1994) 
 
Henry (1994) 
Youngren, et al. (1994) 
 
Russel & McQuay (1993) 
Kathman (1995) 
 
Garrambone (1992) 
 
Garrabrants (1998) 
JLINK-JANUS fast movers 
Military force structure and 
realignment “ sharpening the edge” 
through the dynamic simulation 
The close combat tactical training 
program 
A battalion / brigade training 
simulation 
Combat vehicle reliability assessment 
simulation model  
Modeling qualitative issues in military 
simulations with the RAND-ABEL 
language. 
Marine air ground task force tactical 
warfare simulation 
The corps battle simulation 
The future theater-level model 
 
The joint modeling and simulation  
Data collection in field combat 
simulation 
An overview of air land combat 
modeling and simulation 
Simulation as a mission planning 
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CHAPTER3 
 
THE SIMULATION MODEL 
3.1. FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM AND PLANNING THE STUDY 
The objectives of this study are to examine the behavior of existing Mobilization and 
Deployment Plan of an Armored Battalion in Turkish Army, establish the nature of 
relationship among significant factors and the system performance, analyze the 
efficiency of Mobilization and Deployment plan of an Armored Battalion, compare 
different scenarios and improve system performance. In the case where the system does 
not work properly, we try to detect the major problem areas of the system, and then 
propose the modifications to make the system work properly. Specifically, we will 
attempt to answer the following research questions: 
• Is the existing plan efficient? 
• After alert order, can whole battalion reach to Alert Dispersion Area in 30 
minutes in daytime, 45 minutes at night? 
• After alert order, can reconnaissance force at most in one hour, main force in two 
hours be ready for moving to the Assembly Area? 
• Where does the bottleneck occur in the system? 
• How does air attack, artillery assault, mine fields and ambush of enemy affect the 
system performance? 
• Which region of Turkey is most vulnerable against enemy attack? 
• Which factor(breakdown of vehicles, air attack, artillery assault, mine fields and 
ambush of enemy ) is the most hazardous for each region of Turkey? 
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• What are the limits of an Armored Battalion executing Mobilization and 
Deployment Plan? 
• Can I suggest a better alternative plan? 
The performance measures under consideration are: 
• Average time in system measure of last vehicle reaching the assembly area  
• Average time in system measure of vehicles 
• Number of damaged vehicles 
• Number of totally destructed vehicles  
Since the mobilization and deployment are a part of combat, the data requirements 
are hard to provide. The data requirements of our simulation model are: 
• Loading time data 
• Velocities of tanks and wheeled trucks 
• Repairing time distributions of damaged vehicles by breakdowns, air attack, 
artillery attack, mine and ambush 
This study helps to see how the Mobilization and Deployment Plan works, how the 
behavior of system changes under the certain conditions and different scenarios. The end 
user of this study is Armored Battalion Commanders of Turkish Army. We model the 
system by using the following assumptions: 
• Armored Battalion in our model is an independent mission battalion 
• Basic unit is company 
• The construction of Armored Battalion is in Appendix and it is taken from the 
Turkish Military Logistics Procedure (1994). 
• Velocity of armored vehicles are 29 km/h 
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• Velocity of wheeled trucks are 40 km/h 
• Ambush guns are 4 LAWs 
• Artillery guns are 4 155mm. Cannons 
• Air attack gun is 1 F-16 war plane 
• Mine density on the path of vehicles is 6 anti-tank mines in a 8*8 mine field 
 
3.2. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
First, we start with the forming the conceptual model to develop our simulation 
model. During this phase, we consult the Armored Battalion, Armored Company and 
Team commanders who are the main actors of Mobilization and Deployment Plan. We 
also interview with the staff officers who are the experts of planning of military 
operations to build the logical model. Then we write the code of model by using ARENA 
software. Figure 3.1 gives the schematic view of model development. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1.Schematic view of model development 
 
3.2.1. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
We form a conceptual model of Mobilization and Deployment Plan of Armored 
Brigade to convert the real system into a simple system to examine the structure and 
components, which should be included. The Mobilization and Deployment Plan is 
 REAL WORD   
   SYSTEM 
  ASSUMED 
    SYSTEM 
  CONCEPTUAL 
       MODEL 
     LOGICAL 
       MODEL 
  
SIMULATION 
      MODEL 
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used by all troops in Turkish Army. The frame of plan is the same for all kinds of troops 
(armored, artillery, infantry etc.). Only minor differences are made to plan according to 
the positioning and structure of troop, mission type etc. During conceptualization, we 
interview with armored battalion, company, team commanders and staff officers. The 
basic elements of the simulation model is given below: 
Events: 
Events are instantaneous occurrences that change the state of the system. The lists of 
events that occur in our simulation model are: 
• Announcement of alert order event: The alert order is given to battalion by the 
intelligence service. Soldiers take their personal equipments and guns, and then make 
partial loading of equipment to the wheeled trucks. 
• Departure of vehicles from garages event: After the completion of loading and 
preparation, vehicles start to travel to Alert Dispersion Area independent of others. 
• Arrival of vehicles to Alert Dispersion Area event. 
• Departure of reconnaissance force from Alert Dispersion Area event: The 
reconnaissance force starts to travel to Assembly Area for securing the roads and 
Assembly Area. 
• Breakdown of vehicles during march from Alert Dispersion Area to Assembly Area 
event: The broken vehicle is moved off the road not to prevent traffic flow and wait 
for repairing by maintenance team. 
• Air attack of enemy during march event: The damaged vehicle is moved off the road 
not to prevent traffic flow and wait for repairing by maintenance team. If the vehicle 
is totally destructed, it is left in a safe area. The same procedure is also valid for in 
the situation of artillery assault, ambush and mine fields. 
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• Artillery assault of enemy during march event. 
• Hitting ground mines of enemy during march event. 
• Ambush of enemy event. 
• Failure of vehicles because of air and artillery attack, breakdowns, ground mines and 
ambushes. 
• Completion of repair of damaged and broken vehicles event. 
• Departure of damaged and broken vehicles from the repair areas event. 
• Arrival of totally destructed vehicles to a safe area. 
• Arrival of vehicles to Assembly Area event. 
Entities: 
Entities are the objects of an interest in the system that requires an explicit 
representation in the system. There is only one type of entity in our system and it is 
vehicles of Armored Battalion.  
Attributes: 
 Attributes are the characteristics of the entities. In our model, we have the 
following attributes: 
• The beginning time of Mobilization activity 
• Company identification numbers 
• Vehicle identification numbers 
• Type of damage that the vehicle takes 
• Air attack identification numbers (helicopter or plane attack) 
Activities: 
Activity represents a time period of specified length. Some of activities are: 
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• Equipment loading in garages 
• March of vehicles from garages to Alert Dispersion Area 
• Preparation of main troops of Armored Battalion in Alert Dispersion Area for march 
to Assembly Area 
• March of Armored Battalion from Alert Dispersion Area to Assembly Area 
Exogenous Variables (Input Variables): 
We have two types of input variables: decision variables(controllable variables) 
and parameters(uncontrollable variables). 
Decision Variables: 
• Velocity of vehicles 
Parameters 
• Time that we spent for partial loading of equipment and preparation for march to 
Alert Dispersion Area (most of the equipment (ammunition, guns etc.) is loaded 
before the alarm order according to the intelligence report, only the equipment that is 
essential for soldiers to continue their daily activities in barracks is left unloaded.) 
• Readiness time of reconnaissance force for march to Assembly Area from Alert 
Dispersion Area 
• Readiness time of main force (Armored Battalion) for march to Assembly Area from 
Alert Dispersion Area 
• Repair time of vehicles broken by breakdowns 
• Repair time of vehicles damaged by air attack, artillery assault, mine fields and 
ambushes 
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Endogenous Variables (Output Variables): 
We classify the endogenous variables as state variables and performance 
measures. 
State Variables: 
• Number of vehicles waiting in the repair queues 
• Number of vehicles that does not damaged or broken in the convoy 
• State of repair units (busy or idle) 
Performance Measures 
• Average time in system measure of last vehicle reaching the assembly area  
• Average time in system measure of vehicles 
• Number of damaged wheeled trucks because of breakdowns 
• Number of damaged wheeled trucks because of air attack 
• Number of damaged wheeled trucks because of artillery assault 
• Number of damaged wheeled trucks because of ground mines 
• Number of damaged wheeled trucks because of ambush 
• Number of damaged armored vehicles because of breakdowns 
• Number of damaged armored vehicles because of air attack 
• Number of damaged armored vehicles because of artillery assault 
• Number of damaged armored vehicles because of ground mines  
• Number of damaged armored vehicles because of ambush 
• Number of totally destructed wheeled trucks because of breakdowns 
• Number of totally destructed wheeled trucks because of air attack 
• Number of totally destructed wheeled trucks because of artillery assault 
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• Number of totally destructed wheeled trucks because of ground mines  
• Number of totally destructed wheeled trucks because of ambush 
• Number of totally destructed armored vehicles because of breakdowns 
• Number of totally destructed armored vehicles because of air attack 
• Number of totally destructed armored vehicles because of artillery assault 
• Number of totally destructed armored vehicles because of ground mines  
• Number of totally destructed armored vehicles because of ambush 
• Total number of damaged vehicles  
• Total number of totally destructed vehicles 
 
3.2.2 LOGICAL MODEL 
Logical model shows the relationships among the elements of the model. We 
construct the logical model of Mobilization and Deployment Plan of a Turkish 
Armored Battalion. Our model starts with the receiving of alert order and ends with 
the occupation of Assembly Area by the Armored Battalion. The main events that 
our model includes are the partial loading of the wheeled-trucks, march of Armored 
Battalion from garages to Alert Dispersion Area, march from Alert Dispersion Area 
to Assembly Area, and attacks of enemy against the Armored Battalion during this 
march. During the construction of logical model, we take the consultancy of 
Armored Battalion and Company commanders who are the executers of the 
Mobilization and Deployment Plan. We present the relationship among the elements 
of the Mobilization and Deployment Plan of an Armored Battalion in Figure 3.2. as 
flow charts. 
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Figure 3.2. Flow chart of Mobilization and Deployment of Armored Battalion  
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Figure 3.2. Flow chart of Mobilization and Deployment of Armored Battalion (con’t) 
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Figure 3.2. Flow chart of Mobilization and Deployment of Armored Battalion (con’t) 
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Figure 3.2. Flow chart of Mobilization and Deployment of Armored Battalion (con’t) 
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Figure 3.2. Flow chart of Mobilization and Deployment of Armored Battalion (con’t) 
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3.2.3 SIMULATION MODEL (COMPUTER CODE) 
Although our simulation model can be described as a combat simulation, we use 
ARENA software, which is not a combat simulation package. Because we need a 
detailed evaluation of Mobilization and Deployment Plan. The Mobilization and 
Deployment Plan include the activities just before the war. In other words, it organizes 
the combat preparation and alert activities. It is a detailed plan, and every detail is too 
important because the objective of plan is to prepare the troops for combat as soon as 
possible after alert. As time so important, to model the details is also important. The 
currently available combat simulation packages in Turkish Army do not support such 
kind of detailed modeling. The most available combat simulation package in Turkish 
Army for our subject is JANUS. But it is especially used for modeling the combat area 
activities. The Alert, Mobilization and Deployment Plan organizes the combat 
preparation and alert activities, not the combat. The details that JANUS cannot model are 
stated below: 
      1) The preparation period which soldiers take their equipment and guns. 
      2) Loading of equipment to the lorries. 
      3) The details of modeling the transportation of soldiers and equipment with vehicles.  
These activities cannot be modeled with JANUS. Thus, we use ARENA software 
for modeling The Alert, Mobilization and Deployment Plan of an Armored Battalion in 
Turkish Army. ARENA software is a flexible and powerful tool that allows modeling all 
the activities of mobilization and deployment plan of Armored Battalions. It also 
provides creating animated models and offers reasonably good simulation input and 
output process. We have only one animated model. The computer codes of model occupy 
4.68 MB. We give a small part of the code of our simulation model in Appendix D. 
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3.3 INPUT DATA ANALYSIS 
As our simulation model is a combat simulation model, we face with lackg of real 
data problem. To overcome this problem, we use triangular distributions as 
recommended by Banks (1998). We interview with the armored battalion, armored 
company and the armored team commanders who are the real executers of Mobilization 
and Deployment Plan to determine the triangular distributions of activities. We also take 
some of data from the Army Field Manuals that are written according to the combat 
experiences. We convert these types of raw data into the triangular distributions via 
consulting the experts. We take hit and kill probabilities of guns, and vulnerability of 
combat vehicles from the databases of JANUS software. We give the lists of random 
variables of our simulation model, distribution functions, and their parameters in Table 
3.3.1.-Table 3.3.3. 
 
3.4. MODEL VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
We perform the Verification and Validation (V&V) techniques stated in the 
Army Pamphlet 5-11 published by Department of Army (1999) and Balci (1998) for all 
steps of our simulation model. 
 
3.4.1. VERIFICATION 
“ Verification of a M&S is the process of determining that an M&S accurately 
represents the developer’s conceptual description and specifications” (Army Pamphlet 5-
11, 1999). We applied some of techniques that are stated in Army Pamphlet 5-11 (1999) 
for verification of our model. 
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Table 3.3.1. Readiness and pull-off times of vehicles 
  readiness time after alert order  pull of time of broken vehicle in garage 
wheeled-truck tria (8,10,12) tria (8,12,16) 
armored vehicles tria (10,12,16) tria (13,15,17) 
 
Table 3.3.2. Repair times of vehicles  
type of damage  
  1 2 3 
wheeled trucks 
breakdown tria(15,20,25) tria(30,35,40) tria(45,50,55) 
air attack tria(35,40,45) tria(40,45,50) tria(55,60,65) 
artillery tria(25,30,35) tria(40,45,50) tria(55,60,65) 
minefields tria(25,30,35) tria(45,60,75) tria(70,80,90) 
ambush tria(25,30,35) tria(40,45,50) tria(55,60,65) 
armored vehicles 
breakdown tria(15,20,25) tria(30,35,40) tria(45,50,55) 
air attack tria(25,30,35) tria(40,45,50) tria(55,60,65) 
artillery tria(25,30,35) tria(40,45,50) tria(55,60,65) 
minefields tria(25,30,35) tria(45,60,75) tria(70,80,90) 
ambush tria(25,30,35) tria(40,45,50) tria(55,60,65) 
 
Table 3.3.3. Hit and kill probabilities of guns used in our model 
for wheeled trucks for armored vehicles 
  hit kill hit kill 
30 mm cannon (F-16) 0.1 0.65 0.1 0.55 
155 mm cannon 0.08 0.5 0.12 0.35 
anti-tank mine 0.02 0.72 0.04 0.27 
LAW (ambush gun) 0.04 0.8 0.06 0.55 
 
As logical verification: 
• Design Walk-Through: We perform design walk-trough with the Armored 
Battalion and Company commanders who are the execution experts of 
Mobilization and Deployment Plan to verify the design of our model. 
As code verification: 
• Sensitivity Analysis: We apply sensitivity analyses to check the algorithms and 
code to ensure that our model is reacting in expected manner. 
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• Code Walk-Through: We put into practice code walk-through with the 
simulation men from our department to ensure the efficiency, correctness, 
consistency and completeness in the implementation. 
• Automated Test Tool: We use ARENA debugger function as an automated test 
tool to check whether the activities in Mobilization and Deployment Plan occur 
properly or not. 
• Unit Checks: We also put into use unit checks to ensure that the proper units of 
measure results from equations used in algorithms and code of our model (km/h 
etc.). 
• Additional Statistics: We also check the properness of system performance by 
using additional output statistics that are verifying our performance measures 
(total time in system etc.).  
3.4.2 VALIDATION 
“Validation is the rigorous and structured process of determining the extent to 
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which an M&S accurately represents the intended real world phenomena from the 
perspective of the intended use of M&S” (Army Pamphlet 5-11, 1999). 
As procedural approaches: 
• Peer Review: We realize peer reviews, which are the detailed examination of 
input data, key parameters and resulting output with the personnel who are 
knowledgeable about modeling the functional areas represented in our model. For 
this method, we take the consultancy of the military personnel from I.E. 
department. 
• Independent Review: We implement review with the people independent of our 
model development for validation of our model.  
           As technical methods: 
• Face Validation: We put into service face validation to check if our model 
seems reasonable to personnel who are knowledgeable about the Mobilization 
and Deployment Plan of Armored Battalion. For this purpose, we take the 
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consultancy of Armored Battalion and Company commanders that are the 
executers of plan, staff officers that are the experts of military operation 
planning. With little modifications towards their comments, we get reasonable 
and satisfactorily result. 
• Animation: We check the behavior of our system through time by the 
animation, especially the movements of vehicles of Armored Battalion. We give 
a sight from our simulation model in Figure 3.4.2. 
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Figure 3.4.2. A sight of our simulation model 
3.4.2.2 VALIDATION OF MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
We discussed the structural and data assumptions of our model with two 
Armored Battalion and Company commanders and one staff officer from Turkish Armor 
School. They find these assumptions reasonable for our objectives. We could not 
perform statistical validation of output because we do not have actual combat data to 
compare. 
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CHAPTER 4                                            
 
 
DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTS  
Experiments are carried out by investors in all fields of science either to discover 
something about a particular process or to compare the effect of several factors on some 
phenomena (Montgomery, 1984). For this part of our study, we look for the answers of 
questions: 
• After alert order, can whole battalion reach to Alert Dispersion Area in 30 
minutes in daytime, 45 minutes at night? 
• After alert order, can reconnaissance force at most in one hour, main force in two 
hours be ready for moving to the Assembly Area? 
• Where does the bottleneck occur in the system? 
• Is the existing plan efficient? 
• How do air attack, artillery assault, mine fields and ambush of enemy affect the 
system performance? 
We run our simulation model and construct one-sided confidence intervals to check 
whether the Mobilization and Deployment Plan satisfies the specifications stated in the 
first and second questions. After constructing the confidence intervals, we see that the 
existing system meets all the necessary measures. We discuss this procedure in detail in 
Section 4.2. To answer the fourth and fifth questions, we just run the simulation model 
and check whether the Mobilization and Deployment Plan satisfies the specifications. 
We encounter bottlenecks in the repair units of Armored Battalion, because of the longer 
waiting queues in front of them. By the sensitivity analysis, we find the optimal number 
of repair units for the Armored Battalion. We also implement 2k factorial design for five 
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factors which are breakdowns of vehicles, air attack, artillery attack, mine fields and 
ambushes of enemy to find out an answer for the last question. The factors and their 
levels are presented in Table 4.1. Our aim is to discover the effects and interactions of 
these five factors on system response. Our performance measures are maximum time in 
system (time in system of last vehicle reaching Assembly Area), number of damaged 
vehicles, and number of totally destructed vehicles. As we have five factors, we have 32 
design points. To satisfy the normality assumption, we make twenty replications for each 
design point. Because the maximum time in system measure is one of our performance 
measures, we should take more replications to satisfy normality. We conduct 
experiments for each design point with the 20 replications and calculate the effect of 
each factor and their interactions with each other. We implement analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) to find out which factor or factors have a significant effect on system 
performance and by effect diagrams we explain the main effects and interactions of 
factors. We also check normality of data by normal probability plots of residuals and the 
homogeneity of variances with scatter diagrams and Bartlett’s test, in Section 4.1.1 and 
Section 4.1.2 respectively. To ensure the independence, we assign different random 
number generator for each random activity in our simulation model. 
We give a name to each design point; names and the roles of factors for each design 
point are stated in Table 4 in Appendix B. The expressions “run xyz” in result tables 
means the replication that the factors x, y and z are at highest levels whereas the others 
are at lowest levels. Our performance measures are maximum time in system (time in 
system of last vehicle reaching Assembly Area), number of damaged vehicles, and 
number of totally destructed vehicles and we have five factors, we implement the 
procedure below for each performance measure.  
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Table 4.1. The factor names and levels 
  Lower level Upper level  
 factor description  (occurrence probability) (occurrence probability) 
1 breakdown  0.01 0.06 
2 air attack 0 1 
3 artillery attack 0 1 
4 minefield 0 1 
5 ambush 0 1 
 
4.1. CONFIRMATION OF DATA ASSUMPTIONS  
Throughout this chapter we assume that (1) data is independent, (2) variances are 
homogeny, and (3) the usual normality assumptions are satisfied. To reach correct 
results, we need to ensure that all the three assumptions hold for our data. For data 
independency, we assign different random number generators for each random event. We 
check the normality assumption in Section 4.1.1, homogeneity of variances assumption 
in Section 4.1.2. 
 
4.1.1 NORMALITY OF DATA 
To ensure the normality of data for three performance measures that we use in 
experimental design, we compute the residuals and draw the normal probability plots of 
residuals. As all the residual plots in Figure 4.1.1.1 - Figure 4.1.1.3 lie reasonably close 
to a straight line; we can say that the data of three performance measures are normally 
distributed. 
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Figure 4.1.1.1 Normal probability plot of residuals of maximum time in system  
Normal probability plot of residuals of damaged vehicles
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Figure 4.1.1.2 Normal probability plot of residuals of number of damaged vehicles  
Normal probability plot of residuals of numberof totally destructed
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Figure 4.1.1.3 Normal probability plot of residuals of number of totally destructed   
                     Vehicles 
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4.1.2 DEPARTURES FROM THE ASSUMPTIONS IN ANALYSIS OF  
        VARIANCES  
The assumptions of homogeneity of variances may cause serious problems in 
ANOVA test if it does not satisfied. To check the homogeneity of variances, we draw 
scatter diagrams of variances of three performance measures. There is no evidence of 
correlation of variances in scatter diagrams (Figure 4.1.2.1-4.1.2.3), to be sure the 
homogeneity, we also implement Bartlett’s test. Bartlett’s tests give that the variances of 
three performance measures are homogeny. The test results are given in Table 4.1.1. 
Thus, we can conclude that the homogeneity assumption of variances holds for our data. 
 
Table 4.1.1 Bartlett's test results for variance homogeneity 
  time in system  # of broken vehicles # of totally destructed 
grand variance 4134.68 12.91 2.12 
q 11.71 18.92 14.88 
c 1.02 1.02 1.02 
Xo*Xo 26.5 42.79 33.65 
chi square(0.05, 31) 44.97 44.97 44.97 
test result pass pass pass 
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Figure 4.1.2.1 Scatter diagram of variances of maximum time in system measure 
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Figure 4.1.2.2 Scatter diagram of variances of number of damaged vehicles measure 
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Figure 4.1.2.3 Scatter diagram of variances of number of totally destructed vehicles 
measure 
 
4.2.     EFFICIENCY CHECK OF MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT PLAN 
For the efficiency of the Mobilization and Deployment Plan, we check whether 
any bottleneck occurs during the execution of the Mobilization and Deployment Plan and 
whether the Armored Battalion satisfies the Turkish Army time standards or not. For the 
bottleneck checking, we implement sensitivity analysis. For the control of the time 
specifications, we construct confidence intervals. 
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4.2.1 TEST WHETHER THE MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT PLAN 
         MEETS TIME SPECIFICATIONS 
 There are some time specifications that a Turkish Armored Battalion has to obey 
while executing the Mobilization and Deployment Plan. First one that we will check is 
that whole battalion has to reach Alert Dispersion Area in 30 minutes in daytime, 45 
minutes at night. Second one is that reconnaissance force at most in one hour; main force 
in two hours has to be ready for moving to the Assembly Area. In this section, we check 
whether these specifications are satisfied or not, by constructing one-sided confidence 
intervals with 0.95 confidence level. Confidence intervals are one-sided because we only 
have an upper time limit to compare for these activities. We run our model for 20 
replications; compute averages, variances and confidence intervals. The results are given 
in Table 4.2.1.  
 
Table 4.2.1 Results and one-sided confidence intervals for time specifications 
time of last vehicle reaching Alert Dispersion 
Area readiness time for movement 
  daytime night   
average 26.8 37.84 53.51 
variance 6.067 5.94 8.35 
confidence interval 29.13 40.12 56.71 
standard 30 45 60/120 
 
As seen in Table 4.2.1, the confidence intervals reveal that an Armored Battalion 
can complete the traveling from garages to the Alert Dispersion Area under the time 
standards 30 minutes at daytime, 45 minutes at night. It also gets ready for traveling to 
Assembly Area in 53.51 minutes with both reconnaissance and main forces that means it 
satisfies the time specifications 60 minutes for reconnaissance force, 120 minutes for the 
main force. Thus, the existing system satisfies all necessary time standards of Turkish 
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Army.  
4.2.2 BOTTLENECK ANALYSIS  
During the experiments, we observe that there occur sudden queues in front of 
the repair units of breakdown of vehicle, air attack, artillery attack, minefield and 
ambush. In our model, we assume that the armored battalion has 5 repair units. We 
conduct sensitivity analysis by changing the number of repair units to find out the 
optimum number of repair unit for the armored battalion. We conduct these experiments 
when all the occurrence probabilities of five factors are 1 (worst case), and observe that 
the last vehicle arrives the Assembly Area in 361 minutes when there are 5 repair units. 
As a result of sensitivity analysis, we see that the maximum time in system statistic does 
not change for the 14 and more repair units. Then we can conclude that 14 repair units 
are the optimal quantity for the Armored Battalion. For14 repair units, the maximum 
time in system statistic is 216 minutes. Increasing the number of repair units from 5 to 14 
provides a %40 decrease in maximum time in system statistic. The behavior of the 
maximum time in system statistic depending on the number of repair units is given in 
Figure 4.2.2.  
Thus, as results of Section 4.2.1 and Section 4.2.2, we can conclude that except the 
bottleneck in repair units existing Mobilization and Deployment Plan of a Turkish 
Armored Battalion is efficient. The bottleneck can be fixed by increasing the number of 
repair units 14 for the armored battalion. But this number is computed when the armored 
battalion is exposed to worst enemy threat and the highest vehicle breakdown rate which 
means enemy makes air attack, artillery attack, position minefield, lay an ambush and 
breakdown rate of vehicle is at highest level during the march to Assembly Area. 
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Figure 4.2.2. Sensitivity analysis of repair teams 
 
4.3     25  FACTORIAL DESIGN FOR MAXIMUM TIME IN SYSTEM MEASURE 
Maximum time in system measure is very important for the Turkish Army 
because this measure gives us the time that all the parts of battalion except the totally 
destructed ones reach the target and be ready for the further military operations. 
Because of that reason, we choose maximum time in system measure as one of our 
performance measure. We conduct the thirty-two experiments with twenty 
replications and give the results of these replications, with their averages and 
variances for every design point in Table 4.3.1- Table 4.3.4 in Appendix B. We 
compute the effects at every design point according to the procedure in 
Montgomery’s book (1984) and give the results in Table 4.3.5 in Appendix B. 
To be able to give a statistical explanation, we implement analysis of variances 
(ANOVA) procedure. By ANOVA, we can state which factors have a significant 
effect on maximum time in measure. During the implementation of ANOVA, we 
compute contrasts and variances of design points and use the F- test to find out 
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which factor has significant effect on system response. The analysis of variances is 
also summarized in Table 4.3.5 in Appendix B. We have eight main significant 
factors and interactions on maximum time in system measure. The main significant 
factors are breakdowns of vehicles (65.68 min.), air attack (71.91 min.), minefields 
(12.99 min.) and ambushes (17.3 min.) of enemy as factors, and they all have 
positive effects. Air attack has the most positive greatest effect on this performance 
measure. As seen only artillery attack does not have a significant effect because its 
totally destruction rate is very high. Most of the vehicles affected by artillery attack is 
totally destructed and does not cause a delay in maximum time in measure because 
the totally destructed vehicles are left in a safe place without repair. The significant 
interactions are breakdown- air attack (-28.21 min.), breakdown- mine fields (-12.62 
min.), breakdown-ambush (-13.2 min.) and air attack-artillery attack (-11.62 min.). 
All the significant interactions have negative effects on maximum time in measure. 
We explain the significant factors and interactions in Section 4.3.1 via effect 
diagrams. 
 
4.3.1 INTERPRETATION OF MAIN EFFECTS AND INTERACTIONS 
We analyze these significant main effects and interactions by using effect 
diagrams below. We only give the effect diagrams of significant factors and 
interactions. We first discuss the effects of main factors. We draw all the significant 
main effects on a single figure to compare and also give the minimum and maximum 
values of each effect inside the figure. As seen in Figure 4.3.1.1, the dotted lines of 
factors breakdowns of vehicles and air attack of enemy have steeper increase than the 
lines of other factors, because number of broken vehicles and number of damaged 
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vehicles by air attack in average are 10.15 and 7.35 vehicles at maximum levels of 
these two factors respectively. Repairing them takes much time and this causes 
maximum time in system measure to increase.  
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Figure 4.3.1.1 Main effect diagram of significant factors 
 
Although average number of damaged vehicles by air attack is smaller than the 
average number of broken vehicles, the line of air attack of enemy is steeper. Because 
the mean of repairing time of a vehicle, which is damaged in air attack, is larger than the 
mean of repairing time of broken vehicle. The factors mine fields and ambushes of 
enemy cause less increase on maximum time in measure. Because number of damaged 
vehicles by mine fields and the number of damaged vehicles by ambushes of enemy in 
average are 4.15 and 6.4 vehicles. These values are smaller than the values of air attack 
and breakdowns. And also the totally destruction rate of ambushes and mine fields are 
very high. When a vehicle is totally destructed, it is left in a safe area, and this does not 
 46
cause any time loss. Because of lower number of damaged vehicles and higher number 
of totally destructed vehicles, lines (permanent) of number of damaged vehicles by mine 
fields and the number of damaged vehicles by ambushes have less steep increase. 
         We also look at the interactions between the factors. We start with the breakdown-
air attack interaction given in Figure 4.3.1.2. The permanent line shows the change in 
time in system measure while breakdown probability is at lowest level 0.01 and air attack 
probability is shifting from 0 to 1. The dotted line shows the change in time in system 
measure while breakdown probability is at highest level 0.06 and air attack probability is 
shifting from 0 to 1. As seen in the figure, there is a steeper increase in time in system 
measure when the breakdown probability is at low level. Because when the breakdown 
probability is at high level, in average approximately 10 vehicles are blocked in 
breakdown station for repair. When air attack occurs, all vehicles in convoy are affected 
at the same time. This causes a sudden queue at that time in front of the air attack repair 
unit. If the breakdown probability is at high level, more vehicles will be allocated in 
breakdown station for repair. Less vehicles will be damaged in air attack station at that 
time, so repair queue will be shorter, which means shorter waiting time in queue and also 
less steeper increase in maximum time in measure. 
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Figure 4.3.1.2 Interaction between breakdown of vehicles and air attack of enemy 
The interaction between breakdown and mine fields is given graphically in Figure 
4.3.1.3. Again, the dotted line represent the behavior of maximum time in system 
measure while mine existing probability shifting from probability 0 to 1 and breakdown 
probability is constant at highest level. The continuous line shows the same relation 
while breakdown probability is constant at lowest level. The same reasoning explained in 
former interaction for the less steeper increase in dotted line is also valid for this case. In 
addition, when we compare the interaction of breakdown and air attack with the 
interaction of breakdown and minefield, we see that the increase in maximum time in 
measure for former interaction is steeper than the other when the breakdown probability 
is at high level. Because in our model, the time between occurrence of breakdowns and 
air attack is shorter than the time between breakdowns and mine fields. As the time 
between breakdown and air attack area is shorter, the queue length of air attack repair 
queue will be longer than the queue length of minefield repair queue, because longer 
time between occurrences means meeting with less vehicles in repair queue of reached 
station. This naturally decreases waiting time in queue and causes less steep increase. 
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Figure 4.3.1.3 Interaction between the breakdown of vehicles and minefield of enemy 
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We give the effect diagram of breakdown-ambush interaction in Figure 4.3.1.4. 
The interaction between breakdown and ambush of enemy is similar with the 
breakdown-minefield interaction. Thus, the previous comments and explanations that we 
make in former case are also valid for this case. 
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Figure 4.3.1.4 Interaction between the breakdown of vehicles and ambush of enemy 
 
As last significant interaction, air attack-ambush interaction is given in Figure 
4.3.1.5. The dotted line shows the change in time in system measure while air attack  
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Figure 4.3.1.5. Interaction between air attack and ambush of enemy 
probability is at highest level 1 and ambush probability is shifting from 0 to 1. The 
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continuous line represents the behavior when air attack probability is lowest level. We 
can say that air attack-ambush interaction resembles the behaviors of the interactions that 
we explain above. So the interpretations that we make for two former cases are also 
suitable for air attack-ambush interaction. 
                      
4.4  25  FACTORIAL DESIGN FOR NUMBER OF DAMAGED VEHICLES 
        MEASURE 
We also collect the number of damaged vehicles measure because it gives the 
critical damage information about the attacks of enemy and about the breakdown of 
vehicles. The measure in that category also includes the totally destructed vehicles 
measure. This measure is also directly related with the maximum time in system 
measure, there is a positive correlation between them. An increase in the number of 
damaged vehicles measure causes increase in the maximum time in system measure. 
Thus, this relation can be useful for the interpretations of some results that we obtain for 
the maximum time in system measure. By that type of information, commanders can 
obtain ideas about the enemy attacks and breakdown of vehicle, and can take necessary 
measures to minimize the damage. We conduct the thirty-two experiments with twenty 
replications for the number of damaged vehicles measure and give the results of these 
replications, with their averages and variances for every design point in Table 4.4.1- 
Table 4.4.4 in Appendix B. We compute the effects of factors and to be able to reach a 
conclusion about the significant effects, we apply ANOVA procedure. We present the 
effects and results of ANOVA in Table 4.4.5 in Appendix B.  
We have five significant factors and no interactions for number of damaged 
vehicles measure. All the factors have significant main effects. The significant factors 
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are breakdowns of vehicles, air attack, artillery attack; mine fields and ambushes of 
enemy and their effects are 8.615, 7.765, 6.997, 2.728 and 4.959 damaged vehicles 
respectively. Breakdown of vehicles has the greatest effect on this performance measure. 
To lessen the effect of this factor, the Armored Battalion Commanders should focus on 
the maintenance activities of vehicles. We give details of significant factors in Section 
4.4.1. 
 
 4.4.1 INTERPRETATION OF MAIN EFFECTS  
      For the number of damaged vehicles measure all five factors have positive significant 
main effects, but there is no significant interaction. To be able to compare the effects of 
factors on the number of damaged vehicles measure, we draw all the effects on a single 
graph. The values of number of damaged vehicles are given at both minimum and 
maximum levels of factors in Figure 4.4.1.1. As seen the dotted thin line belonging to  
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Figure 4.4.1.1. Main effect of diagram of significant factors  
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factor breakdown shows steepest increase for number of damaged vehicles measure 
whereas the minefield line (thick dotted) represents the smoothest increase. The reason 
for smallest effect for mine fields is that when any vehicles hit the mines all vehicles stop 
and soldiers began to mine clearing activity. After clearing they begin to travel. Thus that 
few vehicles hit the mines and damaged. 
 
4.5. 25  FACTORIAL DESIGN FOR NUMBER OF TOTALLY DESTRUCTED  
       VEHICLES MEASURE 
The number of damaged vehicle measure provides battalion commander to be 
aware of his military units that have ability to fight, by presenting the number of totally 
destructed units. For that reason, it is an important measure that may change the faith of 
war. It also gives information about the total destruction rate of enemy attack and 
breakdown of vehicles. We implement the same experimental design procedure that we 
mention at the beginning of Chapter 4 for this performance measure. We conduct the 
thirty-two experiments with twenty replications for the number of totally destructed 
vehicles measure and give the results of these replications, with their averages and 
variances for every design point in Table 4.5.1 - Table 4.5.4 in Appendix B. The effects 
of factors and results of ANOVA are given in Table 4.5.5 in Appendix B. We observe 
that air attack, artillery attack, minefield and ambush of enemy have positive significant 
main effects and there is no significant interaction between factors. The effects of 
significant factors air attack, artillery attack, minefield and ambush of enemy are 1.234, 
4.19, 0.959, 0.99 totally destructed vehicles, respectively. The effect of artillery attack is 
the greatest because the total destruction rate of artillery guns for vehicles are very 
higher from others. The other three significant factors have approximately one totally 
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destructed vehicle. The main factor breakdown (0.128 totally destructed vehicles) has no 
significant effect on number of totally destructed vehicles measure, which is logical 
because the totally destruction rate of breakdown is too low. We give detailed 
explanation of the significant factors via the effect diagram in Section 4.5.1. 
 
4.5.1 INTERPRETATION OF MAIN EFFECTS  
We will give details of the significant factors by the help of a single effect 
diagram in Figure 4.5.1.1. The factors (permanent lines) air attack, minefields and 
ambush of enemy has similar and smoother effect on number of totally destructed 
vehicles measure whereas the factor artillery attack (the thick dotted line) has the greatest  
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Figure 4.5.1.1. Main effect diagram of significant factors 
and keen effect on this performance measure, because the total destruction rate of 
artillery guns is highest. So we can conclude that as the artillery guns (155mm cannon) 
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has the greatest effect in this performance measure, the necessary precautions against the 
artillery attacks of enemy should be taken to minimize the number of totally destructed 
vehicles. 
 
4.6. CONCLUSIONS 
As a summary of the results that we have obtained from Chapter 4 is below: 
• We observe that the Armored Battalion executing the existing Mobilization 
and Deployment Plan satisfies all the time standards determined by Turkish 
Army. As a result of experiments, we detect that the Mobilization and 
Deployment Plan has a bottleneck in repair units. By sensitivity analysis, we 
find out that 14 repair units are the optimal quantity for the Armored 
Battalion under the worst conditions. 
• For the performance measure maximum time in system measure, there are 
four significant main effects and four significant interactions. The main 
effects are breakdowns, air attack, minefield and ambush of enemy. The most 
significant main effect is air attack of enemy and breakdown of vehicles 
follows it. The significant interactions are breakdown of vehicles - air attack, 
breakdown - mine fields, breakdown - ambush and air attack - ambush. The 
interaction with the most negative effect is breakdowns - air attack 
interaction. The main effects have positive whereas interactions have negative 
effect on maximum time in measure. 
• For the performance measure number of damaged vehicles by breakdowns, air 
attack, artillery attack, mine fields and ambush of enemy, there are five main effects 
and no interaction among factors. The main effects are breakdowns, air attack, 
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artillery attack, minefield and ambush of enemy. The most significant main effect is 
breakdown of vehicles and air attack of enemy follows it. All these factors have 
positive effect on number of damaged vehicles measure. 
• For the performance measure number of totally destructed vehicles by 
breakdowns, air attack, artillery attack, mine fields and ambush of enemy, there are 
four main effects and no interaction among factors. The main effects are air attack, 
artillery attack, minefield and ambush of enemy. The most significant main effect is 
artillery assault of enemy and air attack of enemy follows it. All these factors have 
positive effect on number of damaged vehicles measure. 
• In Chapter 4, we get general information about the attacks of enemy and 
breakdown of vehicles for three different performance measures. This broad-
spectrum information can be evaluated in two ways. First one is using it for planning 
of national defense by focusing on the necessary measures against the strongest 
factors. The other one is usage of information for planning of military operations by 
the Armored Battalion commanders. The significant factors are different for each 
performance measure. For an Armored Battalion commander, the importance of 
performance measures is changeable according to the type of military operation. If 
the operation is an ambush-type operation, time is more important. If the operation is 
a defense-type operation, then the number of totally destructed vehicles measure 
arises as the most important statistic. So commanders may use the proper information 
for his battalion to plan the military operations and take necessary precautions 
against the significant factors. We give the summary table of significant factors and 
interactions in Table 4.6.1.  
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Table 4.6.1. Summary table of significant factors and interactions 
 maximum time number number of totally 
factors  in system(min.)  damaged vehicles  destructed vehicles 
 breakdown 65.68 8.61  ---- 
 air attack 71.91 7.76 1.23 
 artillery attack  ---- 6.99 4.19 
 minefield 12.99 2.72 0.95 
 ambush 17.3 4.95 0.99 
 breakdown-air  -28.21  ----  ---- 
 breakdown-mine -12.62  ----  ---- 
 breakdown-ambush -13.2  ----  ---- 
 air-ambush -11.62  ----  ---- 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
5. SELECTING THE MOST CRITICAL REGION OF TURKEY  
As a strategy, Turkish Army gives more importance to the troops in critical 
regions. We can describe the regions in Turkey in three categories according to the 
enemy threat.  
• Eastern and South Eastern regions as most critical 
• Aegean, Black Sea, Marmara, and Mediterranean as critical region 
• Inside of Anatolia as least critical regions 
The occurrence probabilities of enemy attacks and breakdown of vehicles are 
different for each region. The troops in most critical regions have priority of having new 
equipments and vehicles. The breakdown probabilities are determined according to the 
condition of vehicles. Thus, the troops inside the Anatolia have higher breakdown 
probabilities for breakdown station. Air attack, artillery attack, mine existing and ambush 
probabilities are determined according to the power of neighbor country’s army, border 
range with Turkey and the distance between that country and Turkey. The harm that the 
enemy can cause depends on the power of its army. Border range is also an important 
effect for combat. When the border is long, controlling the border will be hard. For that 
reason, the probability of enemy penetrations, which can cause artillery assault, 
minefields and ambush will increase. The distance between neighbor country and Turkey 
also affects the condensation of artillery attack, minefield and ambush. For example, 
between Russia and Turkey, the distance is very long because of Black Sea. For that 
reason, artillery attack, mine existing and ambush probabilities are very low. Number of 
totally destructed vehicles is higher in artillery attack, minefields and ambush than in air 
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attack and breakdown, because of the properties of guns and ground mines. 
We compare the results of different regions according to the four performance 
measures which are time in system of last vehicle arriving assembly area (maximum time 
in system), average time in system, number of broken vehicles and number of totally 
destructed vehicles. To be able to compare, we implement ranking and selection of 
Rinott (1978) for selecting the most critique region among the ten regions of Turkey 
from most to least critique according to the four performance measures. We prefer 
Rinott’s procedure because it is more sensitive from others. It is used for the ranking and 
selection of closer alternatives, because it needs more additional replications than the 
other methods, and also needs less computation effort. We see that the rankings are 
different from each other. To get a single ranking, we implement Saaty’s analytic 
hierarchy process (AHP) (Winston, 1994). The Rinott’s ranking and selection process 
can be implemented to the independent and normally distributed data. Our data is 
normally distributed and independent. We check the normality of data in Chapter 4 and 
use different random number generators for each random activity in our model to get 
independent data. The steps of Rinott’s procedure are as follows: 
 
Rinott’s Procedure: 
STAGE 1: 
We run 20 independent replications for each region. 
We calculate average and variance of these replications for each region. 
We find the sufficient number of replication for each region by the formula: 
                Ni = max {no, (h*Si/d)2} 
STAGE 2: 
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We take Ni-no additional replications. 
 
We calculate the average of Ni replications for each region. 
Finally, we select the largest region as the most critique region among ten alternatives.  
Our h value is 3.875 (from Table 8.3 (Rinott, 1978)) and desired probability of correct 
selection is 0.95 for each performance measure whereas indifference amount differs. 
 
5.1. SELECTING THE MOST CRITICAL REGION OF TURKEY ACCORDING       
TO THE MAXIMUM TIME IN SYSTEM MEASURE 
We implement the process above for the maximum time in measure of ten 
regions. Our indifference amount d is 15 minutes for this performance measure. We 
determine this d value by means inquiry that we give to the Armored Battalion and 
Company commanders. The general opinion of commanders about the indifference 
amount d is that the value depends on the type of operation and situation. We assume 
that the Armored Battalion will execute a defense-type operation. Thus, the 15 minutes 
indifference zone amount is reasonable for that type of operation. The results of twenty 
replications, averages, variances and the sufficient replication number for Rinott’s 
procedure are given in Table 5.1 – 5.2 in Appendix C. 
After computing needed replication numbers, we take additional replications of 
each region, and compute final averages of maximum time in measure for each region. 
The final values (averages) are given in Table 5.1.1. We see that the average of the 
results belonging to interior regions of Anatolia is lower than the others. It is logical 
because the defense systems are more effective inner parts of Turkey. The most critical 
regions are the Greece borders (Aegean and Trakya), and Southern East Region (Syria, 
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Iran and Iraq) borders follow them. 
Table 5.1.1. Final averages of regions 
no region  average 
1 Trakya Greece 329.35 
2 Aegean 302.8 
3 Syria 294.75 
4 Iran 293.24 
5 Iraq 292.06 
6 Eastern Black Sea 278.61 
7 Bulgaria 266.99 
8 Middle Black Sea 233.06 
9 Mediterranean 230.97 
10 Middle Anatolia 223.12 
 
The Greece border in Trakya is most critical because Greece Air Force is the 
strongest one among other neighbors, and artillery units are very effective because of the 
short distance between Turkey and Greece. Thus, these two strong factors cause more 
damaged vehicles, which also increase the maximum time in measure. 
 
5.2. SELECTING THE MOST CRITIQUE REGION OF TURKEY ACCORDING 
TO THE AVERAGE TIME IN SYSTEM MEASURE 
We apply the same process above for the average time in system measure of ten 
regions. From the view of Armored Battalion commander, this performance measure 
does not mean too much because, the important thing is when and with how many 
vehicles Armored Battalion is ready in Assembly Area for combat. Thus, this 
performance measure does not give necessary information about combat readiness. We 
include this performance measure for only checking the average performance of our 
system. Our indifference amount d is 15 minutes for this performance measure. The 
reasoning in previous case for the determination of d value is also valid for this 
performance measure. The results of twenty replications, averages, variances and 
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the sufficient replication number for Rinott’s procedure are given in Table 5.3 – 5.4 in 
Appendix C. There is no need for additional replications indicated by the Rinott’s 
procedure because the variances are so small. We can make a selection of the most 
critique region by depending on averages of twenty replications. We give the summary 
of averages in Table 5.2.1.  
 
Table 5.2.1 Final averages of regions 
 
no region average 
1 Aegean 92.01 
2 Trakya Greek 91.49 
3 Iran 91.3 
4 Syria 91 
5 Iraq 90.4 
6 Eastern Black Sea 89.7 
7 Bulgaria 89.14 
8 Mediterranean 82.97 
9 Middle Black Sea 82.38 
10 Middle Anatolia 80.04 
 
We observe that the average of the results belonging to Middle of Anatolia is 
lowest and Greece border in Aegean is the greatest. But there are very slight differences 
between first seven regions in Table 5.2.1. Our indifference value d is 15 minutes for 
average time in system measure, so we do not care about the selecting the most critique 
system because the alternatives are too close to each other. We can say that the average 
time in system measure does not give us necessary information about selecting the most 
critique region. For that reason we do not include average time in system measure in 
analytic hierarchy process (AHP) to find the most critique region among ten. 
 
 
5.3. SELECTING THE MOST CRITICAL REGION OF TURKEY ACCORDING 
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TO THE NUMBER OF DAMAGED VEHICLES MEASURE 
We determine indifference zone amount d from the inquiry as in previous case. 
For the number of damaged vehicles our indifference amount d is 3 vehicles. We again 
assume that operation is a defense-type operation. Three damaged vehicles can be 
accepted as a reasonable value for a defense-type operation because the Armored 
Battalion will occupy the predetermined position and wait for the enemy. Thus, there 
may be enough time for repairing three vehicles before combat. We give the results of 
twenty replications; averages, variances and the sufficient replication number for 
Rinott’s procedure for the number of damaged vehicles measure are given in Table 5.5 – 
5.6 in Appendix C. After taking additional replications needed, we present the final 
averages in Table 5.3.1. 
 
Table 5.3.1. Final averages of regions 
 
no region average 
1 Trakya Greek 25.45 
2 Iraq 22.27 
3 Bulgaria 22 
4 Iran 21.9 
5 Aegean 21.818 
6 Eastern Black Sea 21.7 
7 Syria 21.45 
8 Mediterranean 12.27 
9 Middle Black Sea 12.05 
10 Middle Anatolia 9.75 
 
The Greece border in Trakya is most dangerous and Middle Anatolia is the least 
critical borders for this performance measure as in maximum time in system measure 
case.  The reasoning explained for that result in Section 5.1 is also valid. When number 
of damaged vehicles increases, the maximum time in system measure naturally increases 
because of the repairing times of damaged vehicles. We can say that there is a positive 
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correlation between these two performance measures. This relation is consistent with 
results; the most and least critical regions for these two performance measures are the 
same. 
 
5.4  SELECTING THE MOST CRITICAL REGION OF TURKEY ACCORDING 
TO THE NUMBER OF TOTALLY DESTRUCTED VEHICLES MEASURE 
We put into practice the same ranking and selection procedure for number of 
totally destructed vehicles measure, and give the results in Table 5.7 –5.8 in Appendix C. 
Our indifference amount d takes the minimum value 1 vehicle. Because total destruction 
of a vehicle means it cannot be used anymore, this is an important loss. After taking 
additional replications needed, we give the final averages in Table 5.4.1. 
 
Table 5.4.1 Final averages of regions 
 
no region average 
1 Iran 6.45 
2 Syria 6.06 
3 Trakya Greek 6.04 
4 Bulgaria 5.626 
5 Eastern Black Sea 5.59 
6 Iraq 5.56 
7 Aegean 5.3 
8 Mediterranean 1.33 
9 Middle Black Sea 1.21 
10 Middle Anatolia 0.78 
 
 
The Iran border is most critical because the Iran border is more suitable for 
minefields; ambush and artillery assault whose total destruction rates are the highest. 
These three strong factors cause more totally destructed vehicles, which also increase the 
maximum time in measure. When a vehicle is totally destructed by the enemy, it is left in 
 63
a safe zone and this does not cause time loss. So we can say that there is no a direct 
relation between maximum time in system and number of totally destructed vehicles 
measure. The results that we obtain for these two are logical because results are different 
as expected. 
 
5.5. THE ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS 
When we implement the ranking and selection process, we see that the rankings 
of regions are different for each performance measure. For a decision maker, these three 
performance measures are important. We have faced problem with a multiple objectives. 
Thomas Saaty’s analytic hierarchy process (AHP) provides a powerful tool that can be 
used to make decisions in situations involving multiple objectives (Winston, 1994). We 
use AHP to make a single ranking of ten regions of Turkey according to the criteria of 
criticism.  
We describe an objective matrix of three performance measures by consulting the 
military experts. The matrix is in Table 5.5.1.  
 
Table 5.5.1 Objective matrix of three performance measures 
objective matrix max time in # of damaged # of totally 
max time in 1 1.45 1.2 
# of damaged 0.67 1 0.6 
# of totally  0.83 1.67 1 
 
And then by computing the normalized matrix of objective matrix, we get the 
weights of each performance measures  (Table 5.5.2). 
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Table 5.5.2 Normalized objective matrix and weights of performance measures 
Norm(objective) max time in # of damaged # of totally weights 
max time in 0.4 0.351941748 0.428571 0.393504 
# of damaged 0.268 0.242718447 0.214286 0.241668 
# of totally  0.332 0.405339806 0.357143 0.364828 
 
 
CONSISTENCY CHECK OF OBJECTIVE MATRIX 
To check the consistency of our objective matrix, we implement the following procedure 
(Winston, 1994): 
Procedure: 
Step1. We multiply the objective matrix with the transpose of the weights of 
performance measures.                              A * wT 
Step 2. We compute  
  1/n*Σ (ith entry of A * wT/ ith entry of wT)= 3.000419 
Step 3. We compute the consistency index (CI) as: 
                            CI= ((Step 2 results)-n)/n-1= 0.000209 
Step 4. Finally, we compare the result with the theoric value (RI=0.58) in Table 23 of 
Winston’s book (1994). For a perfectly consistent decision makers are probably 
consistent enough to give useful estimates of weights for his objective function. We need 
to check if   CI/RI  < 0.10. If  CI/RI< 0.10, then we can say that the our objective matrix 
is consistent. In our case, 
                       CI/RI = 0.000209/0.58 = 0.000362 < 0.10 
So we can say that our objective matrix is consistent, and we can continue implementing 
AHP. We construct a 10*10 (10 regions) pair wise comparison matrix for each 
performance measure by using the final results of ranking and selection procedure for 
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that performance measure. We compute the weights for each matrix.  The results and 
weights are in Table 5.5.3. 
 
Table 5.5.3 The results and weights of regions 
regions max time in # of damaged # of totally 
max 
timein #of damaged #of totally 
  output output output weights weights weights 
Middle Anatolia 223.12 9.75 0.78 0.081284 0.051408324 0.017749056 
Greece Trakya 329.35 24.45 6.04 0.119984 0.12891626 0.137441405 
Bulgaria 266.99 22 5.626 0.097266 0.115998271 0.128020753 
Aegean 302.8 21.818 5.3 0.110312 0.115038649 0.120602558 
Middle Black Sea 233.06 12.05 1.21 0.084905 0.063535416 0.027533791 
Eastern Black Sea 278.61 21.7 5.59 0.101499 0.114416476 0.127201566 
Iran 293.24 21.9 6.45 0.106829 0.115471006 0.146771037 
Iraq 292.06 22.27 5.56 0.106399 0.117421886 0.12651891 
Syria 294.75 21.45 6.06 0.107379 0.113098314 0.137896509 
Mediterranean 230.97 12.27 1.33 0.084144 0.064695399 0.030264415 
 
Finally we compute the scores of regions according to the procedure in Winston’s 
book (1994) and rank them from most to least critique and give the results in Table 5.5.4. 
Table 5.5.4 Final scores of regions via AHP 
          region scores 
1 Greece Trakya 0.128512 
2 Iran 0.123489 
3 Syria 0.119895 
4 Iraq 0.116403 
5 Aegean 0.115208 
6 Eastern Black Sea 0.113998 
7 Bulgaria 0.113013 
8 Mediterranean 0.059787 
9 Middle Black Sea 0.05881 
10 Middle Anatolia 0.050885 
 
As a result of AHP, we observe that Greece border in Trakya is the most critical 
frontier for three performance measures. 
 
5.6  THE DETAILED RESULTS OF NUMBER OF DAMAGED VEHICLES AND 
 66
NUMBER OF TOTALLY DESTRUCTED VEHICLES MEASURE 
We give the detailed results of the number of damaged and totally destructed 
vehicles measure by partitioning them as the number of damaged vehicles by breakdown 
of vehicles, the number of damaged vehicles by air attack, the number of damaged 
vehicles by artillery attack, the number of damaged vehicles by minefields and the 
number of damaged vehicles by ambush of enemy. These results are given to see how 
many damaged vehicles or how much time delay do the factors cause for every scenario 
separately. This type of information would be useful for the Armored Battalion 
Commanders of regions that we inspect. Commanders can use this information for 
effective planning of field exercises by focusing on the important factors. These statistics 
are computed from the initial twenty replications only as information; we do not 
implement any statistical procedure to make a comparison. We give the statistics of 
wheeled trucks of Armored Battalion in Table 5.6.1-5.6.2, the number of damaged 
armored vehicles measure in Table 5.6.3-5.6.4, the number of totally destructed wheeled 
trucks measure in Table 5.7.1-5.7.2 and the number of totally destructed armored 
vehicles measure in Table 5.7.3-5.7.4 in Appendix C. 
 
5.7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, we run our simulation model for armored battalions from ten 
different regions of Turkey according to the four performance measures which are 
maximum time in system, average time in system, number of damaged vehicles and 
number of totally destructed vehicles. We implement Rinott’s ranking and selection 
procedure (Rinott, 1978) to find out the most critical region for each performance 
measure. For maximum time in system and number of damaged vehicles measures 
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Greece border in Trakya is the most critical whereas for the number of totally destructed 
vehicle measure Iran, for the average time in system measure Aegean border of Greece is 
the highest one. But we do not care about selecting the most critique system for that 
performance measure because the alternatives are too close to each other.  
For an Armored Battalion commander the number of totally destructed vehicles, 
number of damaged vehicles and maximum time in system measures are very important. 
However the average time in system measure does not imply a significant importance for 
the military operations, because average time in system measure does not give sufficient 
information about the whole battalion whereas maximum time in system points out the 
readiness time of battalion for the combat. Except average time in system measure, we 
implement analytic hierarchy process (AHP) to find out which region is the most critique 
for the three performance measures. After implementation of AHP, we conclude that 
Greece border in Trakya is the most critical region among ten regions of Turkey.  
The information that we obtain in Chapter 5 may be used for planning of national 
defense. According to our results, the defense planners should give the most importance 
to Greece border in Trakya. For Iran border necessary precautions should be taken to 
lessen the number of totally destructed vehicles, which is affected deeply from the 
artillery guns, minefields, and ambushes of enemy. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
6. SELECTING THE MOST CRITICAL FACTOR FOR EACH REGION OF 
TURKEY ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF TOTALLY DESTRUCTED 
VEHICLES MEASURE 
In Chapter 5, we implemented the ranking and selection procedure of Rinott 
(1978) to find out which region of Turkey is most critical. In this chapter, we try to 
discover which factor out of five is the most critical for each region. Again, we will use 
the Rinott’s procedure only for number of totally destructed vehicles measure. The 
information that other measures such as the maximum, average time in system measure 
and number of damaged vehicles measures provide, is subjective, the indifference zone 
amount for them may change depending on the type of military operation whereas the 
indifference zone amount is always accepted as minimum number (1 vehicle) 
independent of the type of military operation. At that point, the number of totally 
destructed vehicles measure arises as an objective measure. Thus, we cannot reach 
general conclusions for these three performance measures by performing ranking and 
selection procedure while totally destructed vehicles measure can help us to reach exact 
results for the degrees of criticism of five factors in the name of total destruction. Our 
five factors are: 
• Breakdowns of vehicles  
• Air attack of enemy 
• Artillery assault of enemy 
• Mine field of enemy 
• Ambush of enemy. 
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In the experiments, we use the following assumptions in attacks of enemy: 
• 40 mm cannon on war plane (air attack) 
• 155 mm artillery cannon (artillery attack) 
• Ground mine for vehicles (mine fields) 
• LAW as ambush gun (ambush) 
We apply the Rinott’s ranking and selection procedure to find the most critical 
factor for each region. In first stage, we take 15 replications for each region and then the 
additional runs to reach a solution. We give the final results and ranks below for each 
region separately.  
 
6.1 RANKINGS OF FACTORS FOR REGIONS 
We give the final results and ranks below for each region separately. For seven 
regions out of ten, artillery assault is the most critical and dangerous factor for number of 
totally destructed vehicles measure, because the total destruction capability of ambush 
guns is the highest (artillery gun has the biggest diameter, 155mm cannon). For most of 
the regions the breakdown of vehicles is the least critical factor since the total destruction 
rate of a vehicle because of breakdown is too low. The summary tables of averages, 
variations and number of needed replications for Rinott’s procedure of seven regions for 
which the artillery assault is the most hazardous factor are given above. The rest three 
regions that have different results are presented separately after the seven regions.  
Table 6.1.1 Rankings of factors for Eastern Black Sea (Armenia) Border  
  factor average variance # of replication for Rinott 
1 artillery assault 1.76 4.4 66 
2 mine-air attack 0.8 0.88-0.88 15 
3 ambush 0.7 0.45 15 
4 breakdown 0.1333 0.123 15 
5         
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Table 6.1.2 Rankings of factors for Iran border 
  factor average variance # of replication for Rinott 
1 artillery assault 2.1 4.4 66 
2 air attack 0.8 0.88-0.88 15 
3 mine 0.7 0.45 15 
4 ambush 0.1333 0.123 15 
5 breakdown 0 0 15 
 
Table 6.1.3 Rankings of factors for Iraq border 
  factor average variance # of replication for Rinott 
1 artillery assault 1.68 3.73 42 
2 air attack-ambush 1.2 0.6-0.622 15 
3 mine 0.733 0.352 15 
4 breakdown 0.0667 0.0667 15 
5         
 
Table 6.1.4 Rankings of factors for Syria border 
  factor average variance # of replication for Rinott 
1 artillery assault 1.77 4.6 69 
2 mine 1.2 1.028 15 
3 air attack 0.8 0.6 15 
4 ambush 0.5 0.5 15 
5 breakdown 0 0 15 
 
Table 6.1.5 Rankings of factors for Greece border in Trakya 
  factor average variance # of replication for Rinott 
1 artillery attack 1.81 4.266 65 
2 air attack 0.933 1.49 23 
3 ambush 0.8 0.844 15 
4 mine 0.6 0.4 15 
5 breakdown 0 0 15 
 
Table 6.1.6 Rankings of factors for Bulgaria border 
  factor average variance # of replication for Rinott 
1 artillery attack 1.65 3.83 58 
2 air attack 1.066 1.209 18 
3 ambush 0.6 0.711 15 
4 mine 0.533 0.69 15 
5 usual break 0.0667 0.0667 15 
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Table 6.1.7 Rankings of factors for Greece border in Aegean 
  factor average variance # of replication for Rinott 
1 artillery attack 1.58 4.12 62 
2 air attack-mine 0.866 1.12-0.98 17-15 
3 ambush 0.4 0.488 15 
4 usual break 0 0 15 
5      
 
The ranking of factors for Mediterranean border is given in Table 6.1.8. 
Minefield is the most, breakdown and artillery attack are least critical factors for this 
border. Because of Mediterranean Sea the artillery attack probability is very low whereas 
the minefield existing probabilities are higher because of guerilla activities of enemy and 
total destruction rates of mines are very high. Thus, artillery attack and breakdown of 
vehicles are the least risky factors for that region. 
 
Table 6.1.8 Rankings of factors for Mediterranean border 
  factor average variance # of replication for Rinott 
1 mine 0.6 0.54 15 
2 air attack 0.33 0.238 15 
3 ambush 0.3 0.45 15 
4 breakdown-artillery 0 0 15 
5      
 
We give the average and variances of factors for Middle Anatolia in Table 6.1.9. 
Air attack is the most critical factor because the most effective combat weapons for the 
inner sides of countries are warplanes. The occurrence probabilities of other enemy 
attacks are very low because defense is very effective for interior regions. The artillery 
attack is the least critique because it is very hard even impossible for enemy to carry the 
artillery guns inside the Anatolia to make an artillery assault against the interior sides. 
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Table 6.1.9 Rankings of factors for Middle Anatolia 
  factor average variance # of replication for Rinott 
1 air attack 0.4 0.4 15 
2 ambush 0.3 0.233 15 
3 mine 0.266 0.209 15 
4 usual break 0.133 0.123 15 
5 artillery attack 0 0 15 
 
For the Middle Black Sea region, ambush is the most critical factor, artillery 
assault and breakdown is the least critical factors for this region. The ambush probability 
is highest because of guerilla activities of enemy; the artillery assault is the lowest 
because of the Black sea. The results for this region are presented in Table 6.1.10. 
Table 6.1.10. Rankings of factors for Middle Black Sea border 
  factor average variance # of replication for Rinott 
1 ambush 0.6 0.933 15 
2 air attack-mine 0.466 0.4-0.55 15 
3 artillery-usual 0 0 15 
4         
5         
 
6.2 CONCLUSIONS 
For most of the regions, the artillery assault is the most critical factor (other 
factors also have critical effect) because the total destruction rates of artillery guns are 
very higher than others (artillery gun has the biggest diameter that causes more totally 
destructed vehicles). For most of the regions, the breakdown is the least critical factor, 
because the total destruction rate of a broken vehicle is very low. Armored Battalion 
commanders can use results related to his battalion to minimize the number of totally 
destructed vehicles by giving more importance to the field exercises of the most critical 
factors and taking necessary safety measures for the significant factors. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
7. LIMITS OF MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT PLAN 
To find out when our system collapse, we run the model under the worst enemy 
threat. Up to now, our assumptions about the enemy forces were: 
• 1 F-16 with 40 mm cannon on it 
• 1 artillery platoon (4 155 mm artillery cannon) 
• 6 ground mines for vehicles in an 8*8 mine field 
• 4 LAW as ambush guns 
We run our model for two scenarios. The assumptions and results for the worst two 
scenarios are stated below.   
 
7.1 SCENARIO 1 
Mobilization and Deployment Plan of a Turkish Armored Battalion is executed in 
Turkish Land. Thus, the density of enemy threat that an Armored Battalion encounters 
will be less than the threat in enemy land. The assumptions that we make up to this 
Chapter 7 are reasonable for an operation in Turkish Land.  As a military strategy, for an 
armored battalion generally, one artillery platoon (4 cannons), for an ambush 4 LAWs, 
for an 8*8 minefield 4 mines are assigned for assaulting against. To test the system under 
worst conditions, we increase the density of enemy attack as much as possible. For 
enemy it is unlikely to attack an armored battalion with 8 F-16 warplanes, one artillery 
company, 8 LAWs in an ambush and a more condensed minefield. And also the 
probability that all these enemy activities will occur together is very low. As our aim is 
to find the system limits, we run our model under these worst conditions. The 
assumptions are: 
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• 8 F-16 with 40 mm cannon on it 
• 1 artillery company (8 155 mm artillery cannon) 
• 12 ground mines for vehicles in 8*8 mine field 
• 8 LAW as ambush guns 
The results and variances of 20 replications are given in Table 7.1.1. For the Scenario 
1, the average time in system statistic is 504.3 and maximum time in system statistic is 
2009 minutes. Although there is no specific rule for the time delay of any military 
operation, these measures are not reasonable for all kind of military operations. When we 
look at the number of damaged vehicles, we see that 36 armored vehicles and 70-
wheeled trucks are damaged. These are also huge numbers for an armored battalion. Also 
5 armored vehicles and 15-wheeled trucks are totally destructed by the enemy. Thus, we 
can say that the Armored battalion in that condition cannot give proper reaction to 
orders. 
 
7.2 SCENARIO 2 
For armored troops, the Apache helicopters are accepted as the most dangerous 
enemy. Because they have hell-fire missiles that can hit a tank from 8000 meters with 
0.55 shot probability. For the scenario 2, we just replace the F-16 warplanes with Apache 
helicopters to observe the system performance. We make following assumptions for 
Scenario 2: 
• Apache helicopters with hell-fire missile on it 
• 1 artillery company (8 155 mm artillery cannon) 
• 12 ground mines for vehicles in an 8*8 mine field 
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• 8 LAW as ambush guns 
We present the results of Scenario 2 in Table 7.2.1. The average and maximum time 
in system statistics are 868.34 and 2558 minutes respectively. The number of damaged 
armored vehicles and wheeled-trucks are 46 and 81 respectively. When we take a look at 
the number of totally destructed vehicles, 17 wheeled-trucks and 6 armored vehicles are 
totally destructed. The hell-fire missiles are more effective against armored forces; their 
hit probabilities are very high. So as expected all the performance measures in Scenario 2 
is higher than the ones in Scenario1. 
 
Table 7.1.1 Results of Limit Scenario 1 
 8 F-16 (40 mm cannon), 8-155 mm cannons,12 mines, 8 LAWs 
  average max damaged totally destructed 
  time in timein tank vehicle total tank vehicle total 
1 322.98 1545.64 40 55 95 2 11 13 
2 502.04 1976.11 38 72 110 6 13 19 
3 502.78 1920.16 39 70 109 5 12 17 
4 456.91 1893.76 38 75 113 4 19 23 
5 545.11 2341.43 33 75 108 4 14 18 
6 295.56 1368.21 33 55 88 3 17 20 
7 657.52 2620.02 32 75 107 3 12 15 
8 779.55 2743.89 45 83 128 10 15 25 
9 645.26 2629.47 28 79 107 5 14 19 
10 431.31 1218.98 39 52 91 3 16 19 
11 382.20 1704.73 35 60 95 2 15 17 
12 403.04 1800.74 28 61 89 5 14 19 
13 478.64 1744.60 42 63 105 9 15 24 
14 629.08 2291 30 81 111 4 12 16 
15 413.54 1897.56 39 73 112 8 20 28 
16 479.93 2108.37 36 71 107 12 15 27 
17 467.62 1915.66 34 67 101 3 13 16 
18 600.12 2083.24 38 67 105 5 15 20 
19 643.30 2337.15 41 78 119 2 20 22 
20 450.95 2052.43 31 76 107 6 16 22 
average 504.37 2009.66 35.95 69.4 105.35 5.05 14.9 19.95 
variance 15143.0 163791.8 22.36 82.88 99.71 7.73 6.62 15.94 
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Table 7.2.1 Results of Limit Scenario 2 
 8 helicopter (hellfire). 8-155 mm cannons.12 mines. 8 LAWs 
  average max damaged totally destructed 
  time in timein tank vehicle total tank vehicle total 
1 805.25 2460.06 50 78 128 12 18 30 
2 1049.49 3112.88 44 93 137 6 14 20 
3 929.40 2328.77 48 82 130 8 17 25 
4 747.32 2105.57 51 73 124 4 16 20 
5  833.65 1970.91 55 72 127 4 17 21 
6 703.59 1717.28 43 58 101 3 16 19 
7 821.06 2697.45 47 86 133 9 20 29 
8 1004.76 3277.37 44 89 133 6 15 21 
9 580.93 1800.67 44 64 108 6 15 21 
10 1154.16 3364.48 52 102 154 6 18 24 
11 749.42 1921.96 44 75 119 6 15 21 
12 784.93 1976.90 39 64 103 5 15 20 
13 1026.14 3300.79 49 88 137 9 14 23 
14 1015.85 3123.13 45 94 139 6 18 24 
15 619.36 1835.61 46 58 104 5 15 20 
16 1026.52 3075.41 53 97 150 10 19 29 
17 1013.91 3148.11 44 95 139 5 19 24 
18 590.12 1627 43 58 101 3 16 19 
19 946.28 3107.04 41 93 134 1 18 19 
20 964.71 3209.29 40 90 130 4 13 17 
average 868.34 2558.03 46.1 80.45 126.55 5.9 16.4 22.3 
variance 28283.96 406874.2 19.46 206.26 251.20 6.93 3.72 13.37 
 
7.3. CONCLUSIONS 
Comparing the results of Scenario 2 with the Scenario 1 as seen in Table 7.3.1., the 
performance measures of Scenario 2 are all greater than the measures of Scenario 1. We 
also give the increase rates of performance measures for two scenarios in Table 7.3.2.  
 
Table 7.3.1. Summary table of results of limit scenarios  
  average max damaged totally destructed 
scenario  time in  timein tank vehicle total tank vehicle total  
scenario 1 504.37 2009.66 35.95 69.4 105,35 5.05 14.9 19.95 
scenario 2 868.34 2558.03 46.1 80.45 126.55 5.9 16.4 22.3 
 
The maximum time in system statistic increase 13 times for Scenario1, whereas 
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17 times for Scenario 2. There is a % 63 increase in Scenario 1, %75 increase in Scenario 
2 for the number of damaged vehicles measure.  The increase rate in totally destructed 
vehicles measure is %12 for Scenario 1 and % 13 for Scenario 2. 
 
Table 7.3.2. Increase rates of performance measures 
  average max damaged totally destructed 
scenario  time in (%)  timein(%) tank(%) vehicle(%) total(%) tank(%) vehicle(%) total (%) 
scenario 1 522 1366 55 68 63 7 14 12 
scenario 2 899 1738 71 79 75 9 16 13 
 
As all the measures of Scenario 2 are greater, the enemy forces in Scenario 2 can be 
accepted as limits that will put the Armored Battalion executing Mobilization and 
Deployment Plan into a catastrophic situation. In other words, if enemy attacks an 
Armored Battalion executing the Mobilization and Deployment Plan with 8 Apache 
helicopters, one artillery company, lays an ambush with 8 LAW guns and positions a 
minefield with density 12 anti-tank mines in a 8*8 m2, the Armored Battalion will get 
into a mortal situation. 
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CHAPTER 8  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
8.1. GENERAL 
In this study, we developed a simulation model of Mobilization and Deployment 
of a Turkish Armored Battalion from garages to Assembly Area. We construct a flexible 
model that can be also used for the Artillery and Infantry Battalion with slight 
modifications. It can also be adapted to brigade-level Army Forces.  
The objectives of our study are: 
• To understand the behavior of existing Mobilization and Deployment Plan of an 
Armored Battalion 
• To find out the effects of enemy attacks on Armored Battalion 
• To detect the bottlenecks of system if exist, and to develop solutions for 
overcoming these problems 
With our simulation model, we can test the system with different factors such as the 
velocity of vehicles, the distance between garages and Alert Dispersion Area, the 
distance between Alert Dispersion Area and Assembly Area, probability of breakdown 
of vehicles, probability of air attack, probability of artillery assault, mine field existing 
probability, ambush occurrence probability of enemy, the size of enemy forces (platoon, 
company etc.). 
In our study, we analyze the existing Mobilization and Deployment Plan of a Turkish 
Armored Battalion; examine the effects of enemy attacks and breakdowns of vehicles, 
select the most critical region out of ten region of Turkey, select the most critical factor 
for each region according to the performance measures, maximum time in 
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system, number of damaged vehicles and number of totally destructed vehicles by five 
factors. And finally find out limits of system for an Armored Battalion by running the 
model at extreme conditions. 
 
8.2. DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTS  
 We test out the efficiency of the Mobilization and Deployment Plan of a Turkish 
Armored Battalion by checking whether it satisfies time specifications of Turkish Army, 
whether it has problem areas (bottlenecks). We also apply 2k factorial for observing the 
effects of breakdown of vehicles, air attack, artillery assault, minefield, and ambush of 
enemy according to the performance measures, maximum time in system, number of 
damaged vehicles and number of totally destructed vehicles by five factors. We obtain 
the results:  
• As a result of experiments, we observe that the Armored Battalion executing the 
existing Mobilization and Deployment Plan satisfies the all the time standards 
determined by Turkish Army. But we discover that the Mobilization and 
Deployment Plan has a bottleneck in number of repair units. 14 repair units are 
the optimal quantity that minimizes the waiting time in queue statistic for the 
Armored Battalion. Increasing the number of repair units from 5 to 14 in the 
structure of the Armored Battalion will fix the bottleneck but may bring 
additional cost. 
• For the performance measure maximum time in system measure, the significant 
effects are breakdowns of vehicles; air attack, minefield and ambush are 65.68, 
71.91, 12.99, and 17.3 minutes respectively. There are also significant two-way 
interactions between factors that we explain in Chapter 4. Effects of two-way 
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interactions of breakdowns- air attack, breakdowns- ambush, breakdowns- 
minefields and air attack-ambush are –28.21, -13.2, -12.62 and –11.62 minutes, 
respectively. Air attack has the greatest positive effect.  
• For the number of damaged vehicles, there is no significant interaction among 
factors. The significant effects of breakdowns of vehicles, air attack, artillery 
assault, mine field and ambush are 8.6, 7.7, 6.99, 2.72, 4.96 vehicles respectively. 
Breakdown of vehicles has the greatest effect. 
• For the number of totally destructed vehicles, there is not a significant interaction 
among factors either. There are four significant main effects. The significant 
effects of air attack, artillery assault, minefield and ambush are 1.23, 4.19, 3.96, 
and 0.99 vehicles respectively. Artillery assault has the greatest effect on this 
performance measure.  
 
The significant factors are different for each performance measure. For an Armored 
Battalion commander, the importance of performance measures varies according to the 
type of military operation. If the operation is an ambush-type operation, maximum time 
in system measure is more important. If the operation is a defense-type operation, then 
the number of totally destructed vehicles measure arises as the most important measure. 
The information gained above can be also used for the Turkish national defense 
planning: our study shows that the air attacks of enemy cause great delay for forward 
military operation. To prevent this, the air defense system should be stronger. And also 
breakdowns of vehicles are important factor for the maximum time in system measure 
and number of damaged vehicle measure, which alert us to renew the vehicles for 
decreasing reaction time of Armored Battalion for combat. We have to implement 
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preventative measures against the artillery assault of enemy to decrease the catastrophic 
vehicle losses of Armored Battalion. 
 
8.3. SELECTING THE MOST CRITICAL REGION OF TURKEY  
We perform ranking and selection procedure for three performance measures. We get 
different results for each performance measure. To find the most critical for three of 
them we implement the analytic hierarchy process (AHP). The results are:  
• The Greece border in Trakya is the most critical region for the performance 
measure maximum time in system measure and number of damaged vehicles 
whereas Iran is the most critical region for the performance measure number of 
totally destructed vehicles. 
• The result of AHP shows that the Greece border in Trakya is the most critical 
region for three performance measures. 
• Results reached in this chapter are high-level information that exceeds the 
responsibilities of Armored Battalion commanders. This type of information can 
be useful for the people who have the responsibility of planning the whole 
defense system of Turkey. They should focus on Greece border in Trakya. For 
Iran border necessary precautions should be taken to lessen the number of totally 
destructed vehicles, which is affected intensely from the artillery guns, 
minefields, and ambushes of enemy. 
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8.4. SELECTING THE MOST CRITICAL FACTOR FOR EACH REGIONS OF 
TURKEY ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF TOTALLY DESTRUCTED 
VEHICLES MEASURE 
We execute ranking and selection procedure to select the most critical factor for 
each region. For this purpose, we only use the number of totally destructed vehicles 
measure to reach a general conclusion. The results are:  
For most of the regions, artillery assault of enemy is the most critical factor and 
breakdown arises as the least critical factor for the number of totally destructed vehicles 
measure. 
• This type of information can be used by the Armored Battalion commanders for 
taking necessary precautions and the planning of field exercises against these five 
factors. The commander should give more emphasis to the training against the 
most critical factor for his region. 
 
8.5. LIMITS OF MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT PLAN OF ARMORED 
BATTALION 
 
To find out when our system fails, we run the model under the worst enemy threat. 
We observe after experiments that, if enemy attacks an Armored Battalion executing the 
Mobilization and Deployment Plan with 8 Apache helicopters, one artillery company, 
lays an ambush with 8 LAW guns and positions a minefield with density 12 anti-tank 
mines in a 8*8 m2, the Armored Battalion will get into a mortal situation. We can 
conclude that when the enemy attacks to an Armored Battalion with the force that we 
stated below, enemy will cause the dead of battalion before getting into the battlefield. 
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Thus, the enemy forces mentioned below are the limits of the system. 
 
8.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We draw following conclusions from our study: 
• The existing Mobilization and Deployment Plan of Armored Battalion does not 
have a serious problem during the movement from garages to Alert Dispersion 
Area. Under the assumption that the vehicles are loaded before the alert order, it 
satisfies the time limitations. But it needs a modification for the number of repair 
units in structure of Armored Battalion. 
• During the march from Alert Dispersion Area to Assembly Area there are five 
significant factors that affect the performance of the Armored Battalion. The 
factors are breakdowns of vehicles, air attack of enemy, artillery attack, mine 
fields and ambushes of enemy. Only the breakdown of vehicles is the controllable 
factor for Turkish Army. As it is a significant factor, the renewing of vehicle or 
giving more emphasis on maintenance activites can decrease the effect of it. For 
the other factors that are not controllable, the national defense system can be 
strengthened to lessen the effects of them. 
 
8.7. FUTURE RESEARCH TOPICS 
Combat modeling is the most important issue in military. It is the modeling of 
actions that may cause many casualties. By combat modeling, the military systems can 
be examined with no losses and less cost. Simulation arises as one of the main tools of 
combat modeling because terrain factors that the military operations continue and the 
structure changes in military units can be the only issue to be handled by the simulation 
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to triumph over the problems.  
We do not deal with the activities that are loading of ammunition and equipment 
to wheeled trucks from depots and fuel oil filling of vehicles. These are also very 
important factors that must be done before the alert order. A further study, including 
these activities can be executed.  
In our study, we make assumptions about the enemy forces and guns that are the 
minor part of the whole alternatives. Thus, different types alternative scenarios can be 
modeled for the Mobilization and Deployment Plan for future studies. And also we do 
not deal with the terrain factors, the future studies may undertaken the terrain factors. 
Our study considers the Mobilization and Deployment Plan of an Armored 
Battalion. Future studies may consider the other types of battalions (infantry, artillery, 
etc.) or the military units from different levels (brigade, company, etc.). 
We take the vehicles of Armored Battalion as entities, so we only deal with the 
vehicles in our study and evaluate the system in the name of vehicles. A more detailed 
study that takes soldiers as entities may be conducted. We do not take care of the cost in 
our study; this factor can be included in future studies. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
RESULTS OF 20 REPLICATIONS FOR EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
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Table 4.1.  Factor names and roles of factors for design points 
 
  Break(0.01-0.06) air(0-1) artillery(0-1) mine(0-1) ambush(0-1) design points 
1 - - - - - run 
2 + - - - - run1 
3 - + - - - run2 
4 - - + - - run3 
5 - - - + - run4 
6 - - - - + run5 
7 + + - - - run12 
8 + - + - - run13 
9 + - - + - run14 
10 + - - - + run15 
11 - + + - - run23 
12 - + - + - run24 
13 - + - - + run25 
14 - - + + - run34 
15 - - + - + run35 
16 - - - + + run45 
17 + + + - - run123 
18 + + - + - run124 
19 + + - - + run125 
20 + - + + - run134 
21 + - + - + run135 
22 + - - + + run145 
23 - + + + - run234 
24 - + + - + run235 
25 - + - + + run245 
26 - - - + + run345 
27 + + + + - run1234 
28 + + + - + run1235 
29 + + - + + run1245 
30 + - + + + run1345 
31 - + + + + run2345 
32 + - + + + run12345 
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Table 4.3.1. Results. averages and variances of 20 replications for maximum time in 
   run 0 run1 run2  run3 run4 run5 run12 run13 
1 159 418 351.5 201.98 347.16 222.27 379 372 
2 149 286 280.24 157.15 162.69 225.27 284 272 
3 145 277 209.38 163.35 254.36 229.31 327 313 
4 161 365 373.88 180.32 231.04 256.67 301 309 
5 115 227 315.76 186.15 223.58 351.82 233 263 
6 103 335 347.2 213.32 368.11 237.07 302 450 
7 147 198 325.32 207.91 162.81 178.2 421 170 
8 111 330 225.94 158.4 147.99 203.5 458 478 
9 137 297 366.09 185.59 199.49 207.07 452 300 
10 164 299 351.37 189.08 166.13 236.87 427 390 
11 177 302 326.39 191.72 191.79 192.65 326 341 
12 199 327 402.6 280.17 204.78 183.1 390 215 
13 141 343 188.64 154.19 217.45 235.38 303 353 
14 104 246 198.72 290.45 194.74 271.92 283 259 
15 179 280 222.7 157.49 144.34 253.54 264 331 
16 105 206 211.22 201.39 250.63 160.28 442 270 
17 225 259 245.78 192.63 184.79 246.66 293 220 
18 102 353 287.07 210.75 194.94 279.58 288 257 
19 128 334 393.55 224.5 352.56 316.27 487 345 
20 191 319 355.93 163.41 180 254.64 446 261 
average 147.1 300.05 298.964 195.4975 218.969 237.1035 17.85 16.45 
variance 1246.095 3025.418 5001.383 1386.733 4412.529 2116.553 6126.747 5915.524 
 
 Table 4.3.2. Results. averages and variances of 20 replications for maximum time in 
  run14 run15 run23  run 24 run25 run34  run35 run45 
1 366 399.59 390.98 314.43 355.56 261.36 164.39 348.68 
2 265 234.45 323.37 331.32 307.77 199.8 225.3 261.03 
3 313 297.16 239.82 247.51 222 258.37 258.59 216.62 
4 338 360.62 262.86 350.66 240.53 169.96 174.44 185.29 
5 247 365.25 338.86 265.98 343.05 244.54 368.35 308.69 
6 380 434.94 279.91 376.19 328.89 362.79 183.65 357.14 
7 238 209.01 262.28 408.86 308.26 207.41 278.56 159.64 
8 382 459.87 309.83 380.43 307.96 219.03 214.49 252.05 
9 338 333.18 486.13 364.73 435.16 173.04 242.43 236.85 
10 308 283.25 445.13 468.4 450.8 227.71 193.08 210.2 
11 305 302.2 309.61 219.59 348.81 247.36 213.3 192.18 
12 282 249.74 397.65 338.86 325.78 273.26 247.49 203.25 
13 384 414.41 298.32 293.87 304.95 270.83 228.35 227.49 
14 250 268.07 307.53 238.38 239.4 206.99 189.28 256.6 
15 401 336.89 212.81 247.97 207.62 163.74 204.44 206.96 
16 335 297.58 208.68 250.5 208.87 177.88 235.25 237.89 
17 218 230.75 278.1 277.77 349.56 286.91 264.42 275.12 
18 300 365.52 359.14 260.81 289.29 151.71 218.78 253.35 
19 453 314.29 367.01 392.44 479.81 372.1 236.64 320.36 
20 253 270.61 257.51 375.4 449.07 173.95 206.52 220.09 
average 317.8 321.369 316.7765 320.205 325.157 232.437 17.85 16.45 
variance 3990.274 4979.673 5433.551 4705.497 6560.31 3794.19 2017.493 2859.336 
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Table 4.3.3. Results. averages and variances of 20 replications for maximum time in 
  run123 run124 run125 run134 run135 run145  run 234 run235 
1 372.76 407.89 364.05 412.94 356.68 355.01 324.14 303.17 
2 334.19 342.28 327.38 330.75 343.49 369.19 363.18 281.15 
3 480.29 309.04 374.44 298.22 244.12 368.77 320.18 219.33 
4 419.17 394.93 420.66 338.89 353.85 324.65 219.88 321.01 
5 305.91 390.29 412.16 306.79 312.89 367.36 250.79 352.56 
6 381.64 331.01 321.77 470.57 378.16 347.44 355.1 321.99 
7 331.51 361.76 385.23 200.57 256.33 231.43 339.45 405.24 
8 347.41 361.91 337.58 366.31 422.87 267.48 366.19 288.78 
9 329.67 372.79 404.04 306.21 317.11 276.47 362.41 389.42 
10 545.24 375.18 530.3 241 262.55 296.69 443.79 561.14 
11 306.65 318.81 320.91 285.58 320.87 296.06 326 259.39 
12 410.33 311.51 383.37 396.45 417.33 205.61 419.75 373.01 
13 376.54 347.68 389.42 380.62 407.93 373.23 360.05 287.63 
14 370.85 259.98 260.25 266.44 263.66 319.96 252.04 237.54 
15 350.08 448.74 294.07 230.92 368.36 380.55 275.18 267.21 
16 352.24 286.46 215.16 298.77 320.94 257.69 202.92 263.6 
17 288.94 354.04 241.5 261.84 327.52 333.48 263.56 349.56 
18 302.46 333.32 278.83 295.22 271.2 312.07 281.86 286.56 
19 420.03 412.11 363.33 328.94 346.33 354.14 398.93 481.58 
20 384.63 463.46 482.75 240.93 254.49 303.42 356.49 287.16 
average 370.527 359.1595 355.36 312.898 327.334 317.035 17.85 16.45 
variance 3930.591 2643.283 6038.194 4555.176 3118.174 2506.963 4281.769 6986.258 
 
Table 4.3.4. Results. averages and variances of 20 replications for maximum time in 
  run245 run345 run1234 run1235 run1245 run1345 run2345 run12345 
1 341.75 401.15 437.2 381.48 448.66 431.66 349 361.53 
2 278.8 272.86 342.54 342.95 377.49 340.17 333.83 387.12 
3 219.44 278.78 307 370.15 219.85 357.08 224.13 359.32 
4 338.16 297.17 383.9 344.51 478.6 345.62 318.35 411.48 
5 436.04 348.32 400.1 367.48 473.63 414.13 442.12 396.59 
6 342.24 313.46 398.57 322.48 370.13 336.09 320.76 356.06 
7 279.53 214.58 344.21 384.04 419.55 270.85 381.08 337.71 
8 302.66 328.17 406.14 382.16 321.14 269.47 270.52 443.96 
9 386.46 216.71 393.91 432.26 414.03 302.41 304.76 454.58 
10 529.93 270.38 409.77 470.01 439.46 324.06 484.79 434.83 
11 271.05 200.13 315.25 325.62 296.58 323.58 244.88 347.05 
12 466.72 231.34 356.9 328.91 316.96 266.3 417.82 350.33 
13 358.59 288.86 374.87 397.61 378.01 390.73 343.7 384.32 
14 282.56 195.04 277.44 235.47 271.79 227.3 233.51 307.5 
15 253.15 159.89 321.22 267.31 274.2 233.39 249.51 279.44 
16 229.22 192.36 212.93 310.58 311.41 193.85 287.32 295.33 
17 351.51 316.38 336.94 298.15 295.65 282.45 344.21 335.89 
18 271.54 338.47 267.87 360.83 278.48 263.14 321.98 284.85 
19 387.77 347.61 433.54 383.44 403.1 393.54 371.66 380.09 
20 393.24 198.46 398.12 381.9 387.88 380.88 335.28 316.36 
average 336.018 270.506 355.921 354.367 358.83 317.335 17.85 16.45 
variance 6562.572 4411.6 3498.781 2909.293 5593.41 4360.184 4730.749 2611.693 
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Table 4.3.5. Effects and Results of Analysis of Variance for maximum time in system statistic 
source of 
variation average effect SSx df MSx Fo   
1 300.5 65.68275 690275.7836 1 690275.78 167.9404 significant 
2 298.96 71.91 827367.696 1 827367.7 201.2941 significant 
3 195.48 7.259 8430.89296 1 8430.893 2.051191 insignificant 
4 218.5 12.99 26998.416 1 26998.416 6.568569 significant 
5 237.1 17.3 47886.4 1 47886.4 11.6505 significant 
12 355.39 -28.21 127328.656 1 127328.66 30.97838 significant 
13 308.43 -4.24 2876.416 1 2876.416 0.699817 insignificant 
14 317.8 -12.62 25482.304 1 25482.304 6.199708 significant 
15 321.36 -13.2 27878.4 1 27878.4 6.782665 significant 
23 316.76 -3.47 1926.544 1 1926.544 0.468718 insignificant 
24 320.2 -8.024 10301.53216 1 10301.532 2.506307 insignificant 
25 325.08 -11.62 21603.904 1 21603.904 5.256114 significant 
34 232.38 -3.64 2119.936 1 2119.936 0.515769 insignificant 
35 227.37 -5.14 4227.136 1 4227.136 1.028439 insignificant 
45 246.47 -5.401 4667.32816 1 4667.3282 1.135536 insignificant 
123 371.014 4.16 2768.896 1 2768.896 0.673658 insignificant 
124 359.15 6.99 7817.616 1 7817.616 1.901984 insignificant 
125 355.36 4.861 3780.69136 1 3780.6914 0.919822 insignificant 
134 312.87 -0.59 55.696 1 55.696 0.013551 insignificant 
135 327.36 4.31 2972.176 1 2972.176 0.723114 insignificant 
145 317 3.611 2086.29136 1 2086.2914 0.507583 insignificant 
234 324.01 -1.231 242.45776 1 242.45776 0.058989 insignificant 
235 326.83 0.433 29.99824 1 29.99824 0.007298 insignificant 
245 336 6.09 5934.096 1 5934.096 1.443734 insignificant 
345 270.5 6.389 6531.09136 1 6531.0914 1.588979 insignificant 
1234 355.89 1.631 425.62576 1 425.62576 0.103552 insignificant 
1235 354.8 -2.09 698.896 1 698.896 0.170038 insignificant 
1245 358.81 1.15 211.6 1 211.6 0.051481 insignificant 
1345 317.33 -2.686 1154.33536 1 1154.3354 0.280844 insignificant 
2345 328.1 -3.04 1478.656 1 1478.656 0.359749 insignificant 
12345 361.8 4.947 3915.64944 1 3915.6494 0.952656 insignificant 
error     2499028.882 608 4110.2449    
total     4368504 639      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 91
Table 4.4.1. Results. averages and variances of 20 replications for number of damaged vehicles 
  run0  run1 run2 run3 run4 run5 run12 run13 
1 2 13 8 10 6 6 16 21 
2 2 11 6 6 3 4 17 16 
3 3 11 5 12 8 9 14 20 
4 2 9 10 9 6 8 16 18 
5 1 8 5 6 3 9 17 13 
6 0 13 8 13 5 7 20 23 
7 1 4 9 8 3 6 14 11 
8 1 13 7 7 4 8 25 21 
9 1 9 10 6 4 5 22 16 
10 2 12 12 9 3 6 24 20 
11 2 10 7 9 3 4 20 19 
12 2 10 8 10 2 4 18 13 
13 2 13 10 12 8 5 23 19 
14 0 10 5 6 1 8 11 14 
15 4 9 6 7 2 6 14 13 
16 0 6 2 6 3 4 16 13 
17 5 7 6 11 4 6 13 15 
18 0 10 4 5 6 7 16 11 
19 1 13 10 9 7 7 23 20 
20 4 12 10 9 2 9 18 13 
average 1.75 10.15 7.4 8.5 4.15 6.4 17.85 16.45 
variance 1.986842 6.45 6.463158 5.526316 4.239474 2.989474 15.71316 13.94474 
 
Table 4.4.2. Results. averages and variances of 20 replications for number of damaged vehicles 
  run14 run15 run23 run24 run25 run34 run35 run45 
1 17 17 19 15 15 14 13 10 
2 14 14 12 10 11 8 11 7 
3 14 14 17 12 12 18 19 12 
4 16 19 19 13 17 13 13 9 
5 12 20 11 10 16 9 15 12 
6 19 22 19 13 13 17 17 8 
7 7 10 20 12 16 10 13 6 
8 15 22 17 10 15 11 15 11 
9 13 18 18 14 16 9 11 8 
10 12 14 20 16 18 10 12 8 
11 12 14 17 12 12 10 11 7 
12 10 11 18 15 16 10 15 8 
13 18 16 17 15 12 14 13 10 
14 10 14 13 6 12 8 11 9 
15 14 15 11 10 10 7 7 5 
16 12 11 12 11 10 6 12 8 
17 9 11 22 12 22 16 19 12 
18 13 17 14 12 15 7 11 12 
19 20 18 19 17 17 15 15 10 
20 9 14 18 16 22 11 12 11 
average 13.3 15.55 16.65 12.55 14.85 11.15 13.25 9.15 
variance 12.11579 12.57632 10.87105 7.207895 11.81842 12.34474 8.513158 4.45 
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Table 4.4.3. Results. averages and variances of 20 replications for number of damaged vehicles 
  run123 run124 run125 run134 run135 run145 run234 run235 
1 31 27 27 25 24 21 23 22 
2 22 21 25 21 21 19 17 20 
3 26 19 20 25 22 21 22 24 
4 31 26 28 26 25 23 19 23 
5 20 22 25 19 24 21 14 19 
6 33 20 23 30 29 21 21 22 
7 24 15 19 12 17 10 18 23 
8 26 22 25 21 28 17 18 26 
9 30 27 25 19 23 17 20 22 
10 24 20 23 16 18 13 21 23 
11 26 20 15 20 21 14 17 19 
12 29 13 16 19 24 10 23 23 
13 34 31 31 29 29 24 21 22 
14 25 14 18 17 20 20 18 18 
15 24 22 21 12 19 16 14 18 
16 20 12 12 14 18 11 12 15 
17 24 15 18 23 26 18 24 25 
18 22 18 21 14 18 15 13 19 
19 30 29 30 23 25 21 23 25 
20 25 21 27 16 19 18 22 25 
average 26.3 20.7 22.45 20.05 22.5 17.5 19 21.65 
variance 17.06316 28.64211 26.15526 27.94474 14.36842 17.84211 13.15789 8.45 
 
Table 4.4.4. Results. averages and variances of 20 replications for number of damaged vehicles 
  run245 run345 run1234 run1235 run1245 run1345 run2345 run12345 
1 19 18 35 34 31 28 26 38 
2 14 13 25 29 28 25 20 33 
3 17 24 30 28 23 31 26 37 
4 18 16 32 40 35 31 23 37 
5 17 18 27 26 33 35 22 36 
6 15 17 32 30 25 28 24 33 
7 12 14 24 28 19 19 22 30 
8 22 19 22 29 26 23 27 36 
9 18 13 26 30 30 22 23 35 
10 16 14 26 33 26 23 22 31 
11 16 14 25 26 20 20 22 29 
12 15 20 23 29 18 17 26 29 
13 21 17 35 35 33 33 28 35 
14 14 15 23 25 19 20 21 30 
15 14 10 24 18 22 17 17 27 
16 12 12 16 21 16 15 17 23 
17 15 23 31 33 25 23 31 30 
18 20 15 18 28 24 18 23 28 
19 23 21 34 34 36 32 33 42 
20 21 15 31 25 29 24 24 33 
average 16.95 16.4 26.95 29.05 25.9 24.2 23.85 32.6 
variance 10.47105 13.41053 29.20789 25.20789 34.83158 35.53684 16.23947 20.25263 
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Table 4.4.5. Effects and Results of Analysis of Variance for number of damaged vehicles statistic 
source of variation average effect SSx df MSx Fo   
1 10.15 8.615 11874.916 1 11874.916 839.9884 significant 
2 7.4 7.765 9647.236 1 9647.236 682.41041 significant 
3 8.5 6.997 7833.2814 1 7833.28144 554.09786 significant 
4 4.15 2.728 1190.7174 1 1190.71744 84.227024 significant 
5 6.4 4.959 3934.669 1 3934.66896 278.32418 significant 
12 17.85 -0.003 0.00144 1 0.00144 0.0001019 insignificant 
13 16.45 -0.159 4.04496 1 4.04496 0.2861258 insignificant 
14 13.3 -0.115 2.116 1 2.116 0.1496781 insignificant 
15 15.55 -0.209 6.98896 1 6.98896 0.4943736 insignificant 
23 16.65 0.178 5.06944 1 5.06944 0.3585938 insignificant 
24 12.55 0.059 0.55696 1 0.55696 0.0393973 insignificant 
25 14.85 0.028 0.12544 1 0.12544 0.0088732 insignificant 
34 11.15 -0.247 9.76144 1 9.76144 0.6904888 insignificant 
35 13.25 -0.153 3.74544 1 3.74544 0.2649388 insignificant 
45 9.15 -0.121 2.34256 1 2.34256 0.1657042 insignificant 
123 26.3 -0.015 0.036 1 0.036 0.0025465 insignificant 
124 20.7 -0.046 0.33856 1 0.33856 0.0239485 insignificant 
125 22.45 -0.228 8.31744 1 8.31744 0.5883455 insignificant 
134 20.05 0.0093 0.0138384 1 0.0138384 0.0009789 insignificant 
135 22.5 0.0531 0.4511376 1 0.4511376 0.0319118 insignificant 
145 17.5 0.171 4.67856 1 4.67856 0.3309443 insignificant 
234 19 -0.353 19.93744 1 19.93744 1.410302 insignificant 
235 21.65 -0.271 11.75056 1 11.75056 0.8311919 insignificant 
245 16.95 0.159 4.04496 1 4.04496 0.2861258 insignificant 
345 16.4 0.29 13.456 1 13.456 0.9518285 insignificant 
1234 26.95 0.065 0.676 1 0.676 0.0478178 insignificant 
1235 29.05 0.021 0.07056 1 0.07056 0.0049912 insignificant 
1245 25.9 0.665 19.54 1 19.54 1.4230022 insignificant 
1345 24.2 -0.09 1.296 1 1.296 0.0916743 insignificant 
2345 23.85 0.359 20.62096 1 20.62096 1.4586518 insignificant 
12345 32.6 0.015 0.036 1 0.036 0.0025465 insignificant 
error     7850.676 608 12.266682    
total     42471.512 639      
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Table 4.5.1. Results. averages and variances of 20 replications for number of totally destructed vehicles 
  run0  run1 run2 run3 run4 run5 run12 run13 
1 1 0 0 7 2 3 1 5 
2 0 0 1 3 1 0 2 3 
3 0 0 1 8 2 1 1 4 
4 0 0 1 4 3 1 1 7 
5 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 2 
6 0 0 0 7 0 2 1 3 
7 0 0 1 4 0 1 2 5 
8 0 2 4 5 2 2 1 5 
9 0 0 3 3 0 1 3 3 
10 0 0 3 5 0 1 2 4 
11 0 1 0 4 0 1 1 3 
12 0 0 1 4 1 1 1 6 
13 0 0 4 8 2 0 3 4 
14 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 3 
15 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 3 
16 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 3 
17 0 0 2 5 1 1 0 8 
18 0 0 0 1 3 0 1 3 
19 0 0 2 3 1 0 1 4 
20 0 0 2 5 0 1 1 3 
average 0.05 0.2 1.3 4.2 0.95 1 1.15 4.05 
variance 0.05 0.273684 1.8 4.378947 1.102632 0.631579 0.765789 2.365789 
Table 4.5.2. Results. averages and variances of 20 replications for number of totally destructed vehicles 
  run14 run15 run23 run24 run25 run34 run35 run45 
1 1 1 6 1 0 8 10 2 
2 1 3 3 1 2 3 3 1 
3 2 0 8 3 2 8 3 2 
4 2 2 5 3 5 7 4 3 
5 1 1 2 2 2 3 5 4 
6 0 1 10 1 1 6 10 2 
7 0 0 7 0 2 3 4 1 
8 2 1 5 0 4 6 4 3 
9 1 1 5 3 4 4 4 3 
10 0 1 4 1 2 3 6 2 
11 1 2 1 1 2 3 3 1 
12 1 0 6 3 2 5 5 1 
13 1 2 6 3 1 5 4 3 
14 1 3 1 1 2 3 7 2 
15 0 0 4 1 3 5 2 2 
16 2 0 3 0 0 3 3 2 
17 0 0 7 2 2 7 6 1 
18 1 1 4 5 2 5 5 3 
19 0 0 7 5 0 6 7 1 
20 1 0 8 3 3 5 3 2 
average 0.9 0.95 5.1 1.95 2.05 4.9 4.9 2.05 
variance 0.515789 0.997368 5.778947 2.260526 1.734211 3.042105 4.936842 0.786842 
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Table 4.5.3. Results. averages and variances of 20 replications for number of totally destructed vehicles 
  run123 run124 run125 run134 run135 run145 run234 run235 
1 6 1 1 7 5 2 7 6 
2 4 2 1 5 3 1 5 6 
3 3 2 2 7 8 4 6 9 
4 7 3 4 6 5 1 7 4 
5 5 0 2 6 4 4 3 7 
6 7 2 1 7 7 1 7 9 
7 7 0 2 5 5 0 4 8 
8 4 2 2 5 4 5 5 8 
9 5 3 4 3 4 2 7 7 
10 3 3 2 5 3 3 7 5 
11 8 1 0 6 3 0 4 4 
12 8 3 2 5 6 0 9 8 
13 8 6 3 9 10 4 6 5 
14 9 3 3 5 5 2 7 6 
15 4 3 1 5 3 0 4 6 
16 4 1 1 5 3 0 3 6 
17 7 0 5 6 9 2 8 4 
18 4 3 3 2 6 2 4 6 
19 6 3 4 5 3 2 7 6 
20 6 0 2 5 4 0 9 8 
average 5.75 2.05 2.25 5.45 5 1.75 5.95 6.4 
variance 3.355263 2.260526 1.671053 2.155263 4.421053 2.513158 3.418421 2.463158 
 
Table 4.5.4. Results. averages and variances of 20 replications for number of totally destructed vehicles 
  run245 run345 run1234 run1235 run1245 run1345 run2345 run12345 
1 1 6 6 5 3 9 6 6 
2 5 4 3 5 1 4 4 4 
3 3 10 9 4 9 8 7 13 
4 6 6 7 10 4 6 8 9 
5 3 7 8 4 6 7 7 7 
6 0 6 5 7 0 6 11 8 
7 3 5 7 5 1 4 7 8 
8 4 8 4 7 2 6 9 8 
9 3 6 6 10 6 7 10 11 
10 0 5 7 4 3 4 5 5 
11 4 6 8 5 2 6 8 6 
12 2 8 11 8 3 5 11 10 
13 1 5 7 6 4 6 4 8 
14 4 7 6 12 1 6 10 7 
15 3 5 7 2 5 4 2 4 
16 2 6 5 6 1 8 6 5 
17 2 10 7 9 2 8 8 10 
18 3 6 7 5 4 4 8 5 
19 7 5 4 7 6 7 11 6 
20 3 5 8 8 5 4 6 12 
average 2.95 6.3 6.6 6.45 3.4 5.95 7.4 7.6 
variance 3.207895 2.642105 3.410526 6.155263 5.2 2.576316 6.357895 6.778947 
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4.5.5. Effects and Analysis of Variance for number of totally destructed vehicles statistic 
source of variation averages effect SSx df MSx Fo   
1 0.2 0.128 2.62144 1 2.62144 0.93115 insignificant 
2 1.3 1.234 243.641 1 243.641 86.5431 significant 
3 4.2 4.19 2808.976 1 2808.976 997.769 significant 
4 0.95 0.959 147.149 1 147.149 52.2684 significant 
5 1 0.99 156.816 1 156.816 55.7022 significant 
12 1.15 0.14 3.136 1 3.136 1.11393 insignificant 
13 4.05 0.084 1.12896 1 1.12896 0.40101 insignificant 
14 0.9 0.028 0.12544 1 0.12544 0.04456 insignificant 
15 0.95 -0.09 1.296 1 1.296 0.46035 insignificant 
23 5.1 0.078 0.97344 1 0.97344 0.34577 insignificant 
24 1.95 -0.028 0.12544 1 0.12544 0.04456 insignificant 
25 2.05 0.09 1.296 1 1.296 0.46035 insignificant 
34 4.9 0.078 0.97344 1 0.97344 0.34577 insignificant 
35 4.9 0.009 0.01296 1 0.01296 0.0046 insignificant 
45 2.05 0.0906 1.313338 1 1.313338 0.46651 insignificant 
123 5.75 0.0343 0.188238 1 0.188238 0.06686 insignificant 
124 2.05 0.053 0.44944 1 0.44944 0.15964 insignificant 
125 2.25 0.0468 0.350438 1 0.350438 0.12448 insignificant 
134 5.45 0.021 0.07056 1 0.07056 0.02506 insignificant 
135 5 -0.121 2.34256 1 2.34256 0.83209 insignificant 
145 1.75 -0.065 0.676 1 0.676 0.24012 insignificant 
234 5.95 -0.046 0.33856 1 0.33856 0.12026 insignificant 
235 6.4 0.021 0.07056 1 0.07056 0.02506 insignificant 
245 2.95 0.0281 0.126338 1 0.126338 0.04488 insignificant 
345 6.3 -0.0031 0.001538 1 0.001538 0.00055 insignificant 
1234 6.6 -0.065 0.676 1 0.676 0.24012 insignificant 
1235 6.45 -0.096 1.47456 1 1.47456 0.52377 insignificant 
1245 3.4 0.084 1.12896 1 1.12896 0.40101 insignificant 
1345 5.95 -0.059 0.55696 1 0.55696 0.19784 insignificant 
2345 7.4 -0.0031 0.001538 1 0.001538 0.00055 insignificant 
12345 7.6 0.078 0.97344 1 0.97344 0.34577 insignificant 
error     2356.698 608 3.876148    
total     5735.708 639       
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Table 5.1. Results of 20 replications for maximum time in statistic for scenarios 
  Middle Trakya     Middle 
   Anatolia Greece  Bulgaria Aegean  Black sea 
1 339.53 363.25 286 285.75 274.21 
2 199.73 322.78 200.52 269.73 244.23 
3 178.6 198.22 229.65 292.25 237.37 
4 244.86 324.65 186.88 318.45 247.33 
5 352.92 290.32 310.85 178.01 159.38 
6 237.49 314.1 243.2 367.27 209.29 
7 139.77 289.35 331.25 326.54 303.62 
8 171.53 331.99 213.27 339.21 241.39 
9 258.72 449.59 230.44 206.64 277.8 
10 217.34 410.52 234.64 325.62 184.78 
11 232.74 231.99 311.01 383.8 196.6 
12 206.1 413.3 486.43 199.51 275.92 
13 284.68 382.63 317.17 370.2 257.27 
14 164.83 253.03 259.07 237.4 238.04 
15 261.03 236.52 249.39 389.88 219.99 
16 149.19 254.4 240.84 305.14 294.29 
17 170.42 269.3 221.25 242.22 223.73 
18 214.15 282.8 217.74 239.33 200.65 
19 238.76 381.58 227.29 309.89 168.96 
20 247.97 406.42 237.82 228.78 263.27 
average 225.518 320.337 261.7355 290.781 235.906 
variance 3294.440238 5003.137106 4449.33223 4058.046094 1637.309183 
Rinott Ni 54.96453244 83.47247846 74.2327825 67.70455375 27.31691189 
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Table 5.2. Results of 20 replications for maximum time in statistic for scenarios 
  Eastern         
   Black sea Iran Iraq Syria Mediterranean 
1 344.18 366.12 328.15 258.89 233.43 
2 253.62 244.39 270.15 237.76 174.82 
3 243.66 225.86 222.01 205.78 197.28 
4 306.13 335.28 208.25 302.18 202.68 
5 224.13 192.84 306.24 236.82 190.57 
6 231.58 278.96 266.86 280.96 181.78 
7 192.44 310.44 223.51 256.93 264.48 
8 242.49 370.56 336.6 414.03 202.32 
9 357.48 247.02 286.27 255.97 227.91 
10 276.13 277.91 288.67 260.66 249.17 
11 273.25 512.64 228.7 369.02 251.49 
12 401.57 294.52 317.55 206.55 257.95 
13 265.91 361.79 315.45 370.61 277.23 
14 498.64 299.62 370.98 168.27 140.25 
15 218.97 300.8 249.7 257.53 373.06 
16 310.84 245.23 212.47 243.82 270.72 
17 254.66 228.69 233.99 359.25 219.9 
18 227.16 328.92 269.14 229.53 194.71 
19 234.23 201.98 295.66 305.01 242.55 
20 240.95 239.66 208.13 171.91 239.54 
average 279.901 293.1615 271.924 269.574 229.592 
variance 5364.870304 5516.505561 2299.56893 4438.600531 2438.210533 
Rinott Ni 89.50764518 92.03753201 38.3660719 74.05373455 40.67917225 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 100
Table 5.3. Results of 20 replications for average time in system statistic 
  Middle Trakya     Middle 
   Anatolia Greece  Bulgaria Aegean  Black sea 
1 80.97969188 100.872583 92.27901 94.27061 83.41522293 
2 82.02723975 89.4062411 85.18545 88.28968 85.39079871 
3 76.88376915 89.6083513 91.19765 98.742 80.182875 
4 79.33338448 90.1038799 88.64506 101.1501 77.201603 
5 87.63261752 102.082391 106.3033 89.03896 86.21215776 
6 78.86401267 101.723678 90.65045 94.03939 83.05114389 
7 73.9106841 88.6757203 89.74868 87.0491 84.10305264 
8 73.56329869 85.4268795 80.1824 88.62605 88.70803504 
9 76.89963944 91.6523764 91.24092 102.295 90.76777083 
10 76.05082778 96.4123143 97.89529 83.66058 72.17620735 
11 81.72448488 84.7323616 86.539 93.82302 83.19288733 
12 79.8454944 93.2741559 90.97685 88.77911 81.32661025 
13 85.89101681 92.2939882 83.78412 88.0226 82.84849592 
14 77.94628028 82.0991347 85.02793 82.55445 83.04311478 
15 83.19618894 84.7303087 86.92281 98.81348 81.26057781 
16 77.44192688 85.8461963 86.61373 90.93258 78.69133597 
17 82.8882067 94.5546577 91.52622 91.79029 79.15458657 
18 83.78477465 79.8133169 82.45468 85.01472 84.63971246 
19 83.65184643 105.867818 92.24365 104.6742 78.24190245 
20 78.41796854 90.7872289 83.50415 88.76423 84.05990886 
average 80.0466677 91.4981791 89.14607 92.01651 82.38339998 
variance 14.5069266 50.0990387 34.06967 39.93122 17.21815359 
Rinott Ni 0.968135865 3.34341502 2.273677 2.664854 1.149072611 
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Table 5.4. Results of 20 replications for average time in system statistic 
 
  Eastern         
   Black sea Iran Iraq Syria Mediterranean 
1 93.92485199 96.4879889 96.42521 94.53191 85.02941152 
2 83.1296402 84.5402687 82.23703 83.67647 87.53527572 
3 91.42104598 93.8571639 89.76464 90.88702 83.13701968 
4 96.11387647 96.3849096 102.8433 106.0004 77.61937909 
5 96.22798587 94.6913511 100.0834 95.82335 84.21989386 
6 90.72177704 94.932558 89.62466 89.9347 84.54347748 
7 84.44564339 85.420581 83.85871 88.15933 84.69647935 
8 85.28552189 89.9264388 100.0857 100.3957 84.31712413 
9 103.8642825 100.152622 85.00068 91.98402 83.78469215 
10 81.35469549 90.4184085 81.44329 81.10124 75.22573959 
11 90.77225706 98.5832717 86.82369 89.54946 82.76989203 
12 88.33294707 80.4241469 85.86559 79.92388 85.06494801 
13 79.15233588 90.2513462 86.08216 92.75932 88.93285408 
14 96.58219002 88.4006925 87.55966 86.07345 75.8040312 
15 87.08993901 92.2718568 92.34716 93.22029 97.79619633 
16 84.1836153 86.4158398 80.728 87.03398 80.21231251 
17 93.3827979 93.3584601 97.17999 99.6095 81.94807691 
18 89.80909723 85.039228 88.90276 85.98646 75.84595077 
19 93.44286441 96.682057 106.8818 103.9923 85.38767446 
20 84.85616162 87.7932449 84.27349 79.47082 75.59595331 
average 89.70467632 91.3016217 90.40055 91.00568 82.97331911 
variance 37.6878864 28.1913389 58.59577 57.0855 29.15711658 
Rinott Ni 2.515142975 1.88138032 3.910454 3.809665 1.945832572 
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Table 5.5. Results of 20 replications for number of damaged vehicles statistic 
  Middle Trakya     Middle 
   Anatolia Greece  Bulgaria Aegean  Black sea 
1 13 26 27 25 13 
2 14 22 21 21 15 
3 8 21 22 29 10 
4 11 28 27 29 11 
5 8 21 20 21 7 
6 10 29 26 21 14 
7 6 28 20 17 13 
8 12 18 18 27 19 
9 12 26 25 17 13 
10 5 35 23 28 10 
11 10 17 19 20 11 
12 9 19 22 12 12 
13 13 31 20 26 14 
14 5 13 21 20 11 
15 12 21 22 27 9 
16 7 25 24 25 9 
17 7 21 19 15 9 
18 9 16 22 19 12 
19 13 34 21 28 11 
20 11 24 21 19 18 
average 9.75 23.75 22 22.3 12.05 
variance 7.881578947 35.25 6.842105 25.27368 8.892105263 
Rinott Ni 11.85305491 53.01224 10.2898 38.00893 13.37277881 
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Table 5.6. Results of 20 replications for number of damaged vehicles statistic 
  Eastern         
   Black sea Iran Iraq Syria Mediterranean 
1 26 26 25 25 12 
2 18 21 17 20 14 
3 27 26 25 26 12 
4 24 22 21 20 9 
5 22 19 22 23 13 
6 18 26 19 23 12 
7 19 16 16 17 16 
8 20 22 32 22 14 
9 19 17 13 20 14 
10 23 24 19 20 11 
11 19 23 18 21 9 
12 21 17 13 19 13 
13 20 24 24 31 15 
14 26 23 21 17 6 
15 22 22 25 22 23 
16 19 24 21 23 15 
17 22 22 26 26 10 
18 22 17 17 16 7 
19 23 22 20 26 11 
20 24 25 20 14 12 
average 21.7 21.9 20.7 21.55 12.4 
variance 7.484210526 10.09474 21.37895 16.47105 13.2 
Rinott Ni 12.48667763 16.84209 35.6687 27.48035 22.02291667 
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Table 5.7. Results of 20 replications for number of totally destructed vehicles statistic 
  Middle Trakya     Middle 
   Anatolia Greece  Bulgaria Aegean  Black sea 
1 0 6 8 8 1 
2 1 1 3 2 1 
3 1 5 5 7 0 
4 0 6 9 4 2 
5 2 8 9 7 0 
6 1 9 7 4 0 
7 1 10 9 6 5 
8 0 4 4 12 2 
9 1 8 8 2 4 
10 0 6 5 7 1 
11 0 3 6 9 2 
12 0 6 6 4 1 
13 1 9 3 2 0 
14 1 6 9 5 1 
15 1 3 4 8 1 
16 2 6 8 3 1 
17 1 5 4 2 0 
18 1 2 4 4 2 
19 3 4 5 5 1 
20 1 4 4 6 1 
average 0.93 6.16 6.26 5.72 1.46 
variance 0.621052632 5.839474 4.736842 7.292105 1.694736842 
Rinott Ni 9.325493421 87.68335 71.12664 109.4955 25.44753289 
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Table 5.8. Results of 20 replications for number of totally destructed vehicles statistic 
 
  Eastern         
   Black sea Iran Iraq Syria Mediterranean 
1 5 6 6 7 0 
2 2 5 6 4 2 
3 6 11 6 6 0 
4 7 5 6 9 0 
5 10 7 7 5 1 
6 1 9 4 6 4 
7 8 5 6 7 5 
8 8 3 14 6 1 
9 5 7 5 7 1 
10 5 6 7 8 1 
11 5 5 8 5 1 
12 7 8 3 9 0 
13 8 6 6 6 0 
14 7 7 5 6 2 
15 11 4 7 6 2 
16 6 5 8 6 2 
17 5 7 12 3 1 
18 6 2 2 6 1 
19 5 9 5 7 1 
20 9 6 7 7 0 
average 5.79 6.32 6.69 6.59 1.16 
variance 5.8 4.45 7.315789 2.115789 1.776315789 
Rinott Ni 87.090625 66.81953 109.8512 31.7699 26.67249178 
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Table 5.6.1. Number of damaged wheeled trucks by five factors 
 Middle Trakya   Middle 
 Anatolia Greece Bulgaria Aegean Black sea 
usual break 3.766 2.433 2.933 2.56 3.4 
air attack 1.5 5.566 4.2 4.8 2.83 
artillery 0 4.133 4.066 3.7 0 
mine 0.3 1.2 1.13 1.466 0.8 
ambush 0.4 1.866 1.933 1.933 0.933 
total 5.966 15.198 14.262 14.459 7.963 
 
Table 5.6.2. Number of damaged wheeled trucks by five factors 
 Eastern     
 Black sea Iran Iraq Syria Mediterranean 
usual break 2.66 1.66 1.66 1.4 2.93 
air attack 4.4 4.8 4.8 4.8 2.53 
artillery 3.66 4.4 3.733 4.13 0 
mine 1.466 1.46 1.6 1.6 0.933 
ambush 1.66 1.66 2.066 2.066 1.2 
total 13.846 13.98 13.859 13.996 7.593 
 
Table 5.6.3. Number of damaged armored vehicles by five factors 
 Middle Trakya   Middle 
 Anatolia Greece Bulgaria Aegean Black sea 
usual break 2.8 2.133 2.133 2.133 2.133 
air attack 0.55 2.2 1.4 1.866 1 
artillery 0 2.33 2.33 1.966 0 
mine 0.266 0.66 0.6 0.733 0.533 
ambush 0.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.33 
total 3.816 8.623 7.763 7.998 3.996 
 
Table 5.6.4. Number of damaged armored vehicles by five factors 
 Eastern     
 Black sea Iran Iraq Syria Mediterranean 
usual break 2.233 1.533 1.533 1.533 2.133 
air attack 1.33 1.8 1.6 1.53 0.8 
artillery 2.2 2.66 2 2.33 0 
mine 0.733 0.733 0.766 0.766 0.533 
ambush 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 0.8 
total 7.796 8.026 7.299 7.559 4.266 
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Table 5.7.1. Number of totally destructed wheeled trucks by five factors 
  Middle Trakya     Middle 
   Anatolia Greece  Bulgaria Aegean  Black sea 
usual break 0.166 0 0.066 0 0 
air attack 0.3 1 1 0.666 0.333 
artillery 0 2.766 2.8 2.4 0 
mine 0.166 0.4 0.533 0.866 0.466 
ambush 0.066 0.4 0.266 0.266 0.33 
total 0.698 4.466 4.665 4.198 1.129 
 
Table 5.7.2. Number of totally destructed wheeled trucks by five factors 
 Eastern     
 Black sea Iran Iraq Syria Mediterranean 
usual break 0.133 0 0.066 0 0 
air attack 0.666 0.866 1 0.66 0.33 
artillery 2.2 2.53 2.466 2.8 0 
mine 0.8 0.8 0.733 1.2 0.6 
ambush 0.333 0.133 0.466 0.2 0.133 
total 4.132 4.329 4.731 4.86 1.063 
 
Table 5.7.3. Number of totally destructed armored vehicles by five factors 
 Middle Trakya   Middle 
 Anatolia Greece Bulgaria Aegean Black sea 
usual break 0.066 0 0 0 0 
air attack 0.066 0.266 0.066 0.2 0.133 
artillery 0 1.13 1.33 1.13 0 
mine 0 0 0 0 0 
ambush 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
total 0.232 1.596 1.596 1.53 0.333 
 
Table 5.7.4. Number of totally destructed armored vehicles by five factors 
 Eastern     
 Black sea Iran Iraq Syria Mediterranean 
usual break 0 0 0 0 0 
air attack 0.133 0.133 0.2 0.133 0 
artillery 1.33 1.46 1.266 1.4 0 
mine 0 0 0 0 0 
ambush 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.1 
total 1.663 1.993 1.966 1.733 0.1 
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APPENDIX D  
 
 
A PART OF CODE OF THE SIMULATION MODEL (MODEL FRAME) 
 
 
0$            BEGIN,         Yes,headquarters wheel; 
1$            CREATE,        75:,1; 
2$            ASSIGN:        VSayac4=VSayac4+1: 
                             Truckno4=VSayac4: 
                             company#=4; 
3$            STATION,       Enter4; 
17$           BRANCH,        1: 
                             If,Truckno4<2,muh,Yes: 
                             Else,ORD,Yes; 
muh           ASSIGN:        VBROKE20=DISC(0.02,0,1,1,36); 
232$          BRANCH,        1: 
                             If,VBROKE20==0,pull42,Yes: 
                             Else,yukle42,Yes; 
pull42        COUNT:         garagebreak42,1; 
5$            DELAY:         TRIA(8,12,16);                                     take on vehicle 
yukle42       QUEUE,         Vehicle42Q; 
4$            REQUEST,       1:Vehicle42(SDS),430,Enter4; 
6$            TRANSPORT:     Vehicle42,AMMO,430; 
ORD           ASSIGN:        VBROKE21=DISC(0.02,0,1,1,36); 
230$          BRANCH,        1: 
                             If,VBROKE21==0,pull41,Yes: 
                             Else,yukle41,Yes; 
pull41        COUNT:         garagebreak41,1; 
231$          DELAY:         TRIA(8,12,16); 
yukle41       DELAY:         TRIA(8,10,12);                                     Garage storage loading 
7$            QUEUE,         Vehicle41Q; 
8$            REQUEST,       1:Vehicle41(SDS),430; 
9$            TRANSPORT:     Vehicle41,sayac,430; 
14$           STATION,       AITB4; 
15$           DELAY:         0; 
16$           TALLY:         time in system4,INT(VArrTime1),1; 
bak           BRANCH,        1: 
                             If,maingroup==102,dev,Yes: 
                             Else,vdur,Yes; 
dev           BRANCH,        1: 
                             If,Vtruck1#==3,emir2,Yes: 
                             If,Vtruck2#==3,emir3,Yes: 
                             If,Vtruck3#==3,emir4,Yes: 
                             If,Vtruck4#==3,emir5,Yes: 
                             Else,vscenario,Yes; 
emir2         DELAY:         30;                                                harekat emri 
59$           DELAY:         0;                                                 take on 
 109
111$          ASSIGN:        left=left+1; 
247$          TALLY:         check,INT(VArrTime1),1; 
110$          SIGNAL:        102,102; 
vscenario     TRANSPORT:     ,Vcheck1,430; 
emir3         DELAY:         33:NEXT(59$); 
 
emir4         DELAY:         36:NEXT(59$); 
emir5         DELAY:         39:NEXT(59$); 
vdur          WAIT:          75,102:NEXT(dev); 
18$           STATION,       Gaitb4; 
19$           TALLY:         VGiris4,INT(VArrTime1),1; 
33$           ASSIGN:        Vsayac5=Vsayac5+1: 
                             Vtruck4#=Vsayac5; 
20$           TRANSPORT:     ,AITB4,430; 
22$           CREATE,        9:,1:MARK(VArrTime1);                              tank company 
wheel 
107$          ASSIGN:        company#=1; 
23$           STATION,       Enter1; 
234$          BRANCH,        1: 
                             With,0.02,pull1,Yes: 
                             Else,yukle1,Yes; 
pull1         COUNT:         garagebreak1,1; 
233$          DELAY:         TRIA(8,12,16); 
yukle1        DELAY:         TRIA(8,10,12);                                     garage depot loading 
24$           QUEUE,         Vehicle1Q; 
25$           REQUEST,       1:Vehicle1(SDS),430,Enter1; 
26$           TRANSPORT:     Vehicle1,sayac,430; 
27$           STATION,       AITB1; 
28$           DELAY:         0;                                                 get off 
29$           TALLY:         Time in system1,INT(VArrTime1),1; 
34$           ASSIGN:        varisno1=varisno1+1: 
                             Vtruck1#=varisno1:NEXT(bak); 
30$           STATION,       GAITB1; 
31$           TALLY:         VGiris1,INT(VArrTime1),1; 
32$           TRANSPORT:     Vehicle1,AITB1,430; 
35$           STATION,       AMMO:MARK(ammo1); 
10$           DELAY:         UNIFORM(0.5,1);                                    take off 
11$           DELAY:         TRIA(8,10,12);                                     loading 
12$           DELAY:         UNIFORM(2,3);                                      take on 
36$           TALLY:         loadertime,INT(ammo1),1; 
13$           TRANSPORT:     Vehicle42,sayac,430; 
37$           CREATE,        9:,1;                                              tank company wheel2 
108$          ASSIGN:        company#=2; 
START2        STATION,       Enter2; 
235$          BRANCH,        1: 
                             With,0.02,pull2,Yes: 
                             Else,yukle2,Yes; 
pull2         COUNT:         garagebreak2,1; 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
PROBABILITY TREE OF WHEELED-TRUCKS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With 0.02 probability 20 minutes 
tdv : totally destructed vehicle 
 
       
Alert order 
0.45 
  20 0.94 
con’t 
0.35 
  35 
0.19 
  50 
0.01 
tdv 
0.06 breakdown 
  0.02 
12+10 
0.98 
 10 
  30 
1 
 0.02 
  20 
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PROBABILITY TREE OF WHEELED-TRUCKS (cont’d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With 0.02 probability 20 minutes 
tdv : totally destructed vehicle 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
0.35 
con’t 
0.12 
  45 
air 
attack 
0.90 
con’t 
0.10 0.65 
0.18 
 tdv 
0.3 
 60 
0.40 
  40 
artillery 
0.92 
con’t 
0.08 
1.5 
min 
0.50 
0.50 
con’t 
0.60 
tdv 
0.15 
 60 
0.15 
 45 
0.10 
 30 
1
 0.02 
  20 
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  PROBABILITY TREE OF WHEELED-TRUCKS (cont’d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With 0.02 probability 20 minutes 
tdv : totally destructed vehicle 
 
 
 
 
2 Mine 
0.98 
con’t 
0.02 
1,5+10 
0.28 
con’t 
0.72 
0.50 
 tdv 
0.20 
 80 
0.20 
 60 
0.10 
 30 
ambush 
0.96 
con’t 
0.04 
0.30 
con’t 
0.70 
0.20 
con’t 
0.80 
0.18 
 tdv 
0.20 
 60 
0.20 
 45 
0.42 
 30 
 0.02 
  20 
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PROBABILITY TREE OF ARMORED VEHICLES  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
With 0.02 probability 20 minutes 
tdv : totally destructed vehicle 
 
 
 
 
Alert order 
0.15 
  20 0.94 
con’t 
0.55 
  35 
0.29 
  50 
0.01 
tdv 
0.06 breakdown 
  0.01 
12+15 
0.98 
 12 
  30 
1 
 0.02 
  20 
 114
 
 
 
 
PROBABILITY TREE OF ARMORED VEHICLES (cont’d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With 0.02 probability 20 minutes 
tdv : totally destructed vehicle 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
0.45 
con’t 
0.33 
  60 
air 
attack 
0.90 
con’t 
0.10 0.55 
0.07 
 tdv 
0.35 
 45 
0.45 
  30 
artillery 
0.88 
con’t 
0.12 
1.5 
min 
0.35 
0.65 
con’t 
0.57 
tdv 
0.08 
 60 
0.15 
 45 
0.20 
 30 
1
 0.02 
  20 
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PROBABILITY TREE OF ARMORED VEHICLES (cont’d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With 0.02 probability 20 minutes 
tdv : totally destructed vehicle 
2 Mine 
0.96 
con’t 
0.04 
   10 
0.73 
con’t 
0.27 
0.33 
 tdv 
0.30 
 80 
0.21 
 60 
0.16 
 30 
ambush 
0.94 
con’t 
0.06 
0.45 
con’t 
0.55 
0.45 
con’t 
0.55 
0.27 
 tdv 
0.20 
 60 
0.20 
 45 
0.33 
 30 
 0.02 
  20 
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